


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CONTENTS

4 MAY 1990

POLITICAL

INTRABLOC

Vice Chairman of Romanian Provisional National Unity Council Interviewed [Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO 5 Apr]	1
---	---

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Final Resolution of Socialist Party Congress [SVOBODNE SLOVO 19 Mar]	3
Communist Tactics Said To Backfire [LIDOVE NOVINY 10 Mar]	5
Protest Against Keeping Compromised CPCZ Members in Office [LIDOVE NOVINY 17 Mar] ...	5
Mlynar's Views on Change to Democracy Challenged [LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE 17 Mar]	6
Skoda Managers, Minister Exchange Open Letters	7
Government's Policies Contested [LIDOVE NOVINY 3 Mar]	7
Minister's Reply [LIDOVE NOVINY 10 Mar]	8

HUNGARY

Election Results: Individual Districts, National Slate	9
Individual Voting Districts [MAGYAR HIRLAP 10 Apr]	9
National Slate Candidates Receiving Mandates [MAGYAR HIRLAP 10 Apr]	26
Threats Reportedly Received by Ministers [NEPSZAVA 31 Mar]	26
Privacy Protection, Freedom of Information Discussed [NEPSZAVA 2 Apr]	27
SZDSZ Financial Statement Released [HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 31 Mar]	28

POLAND

Council of Europe Center To Aid Electoral Organization [RZECZPOSPOLITA 24-25 Feb]	29
New Appointments to EC, Agriculture, Academy of Sciences [RZECZPOSPOLITA 28 Feb]	29
New Communist Party Founder on Goals, Membership [TRYBUNA 30 Mar]	29
Center-Right Parties Meet To Discuss Cooperation [POLITYKA 10 Mar]	30
National Judiciary Council Holds Inaugural Session [RZECZPOSPOLITA 24-25 Feb]	33

MILITARY

HUNGARY

Defense Minister on Romanian Charges of Troop Concentrations [NEPSZABADSAG 22 Mar]	34
---	----

ECONOMIC

INTRABLOC

CEMA Market More Attractive for Western Capital Goods [East Berlin AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 7 Mar]	35
---	----

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Trade Problems With Developing Countries Viewed [PRACE 17 Mar]	40
--	----

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

FRG Financial Expert on Prospects, Problems for GDR Economy [SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG 9 Mar]	43
--	----

POLAND

Analysis Urges Farmers Not To Panic, Criticizes Continuing Monopolies [RZECZPOSPOLITA 27 Feb]	45
Anti-Rural Policy Denied; Problems of Small Farmers Viewed [RZECZPOSPOLITA 28 Feb]	46

YUGOSLAVIA

Defects of Privatization Law [DANAS 6 Feb]	47
Past Suppression of Initiative [DANAS 6 Feb]	49

SOCIAL

INTRABLOC

Problems of Hungarian Minorities in Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia [Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP 1 Mar]	51
---	----

HUNGARY

Interior Ministry Department Head on State's Role in Crime Prevention [MAGYAR NEMZET 26 Feb]	54
---	----

INTRABLOC

Vice Chairman of Romanian Provisional National Unity Council Interviewed

90CH0055A Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO
in Hungarian 5 Apr 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Karoly Kiraly, vice chairman of the Romanian Provisional National Unity Council, by Janos Gyarmath; place and date not given: "Sooner or Later Common Sense Will Gain the Upper Hand"—first two paragraphs are ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO introduction]

[Text] The election campaign had its official start about two weeks ago, but to use a term from the world of sports, most parties stalled at the start. This comes as no surprise, because the tragic events of Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures] polarized Romanian public attention. Tensions were not created by party struggles, but by the unprecedented deterioration of the relationship between Romanians and Hungarians, who have coexisted for decades essentially in peace and understanding. Unfortunately, as a result of incorrect information provided to the public, in a given moment it seemed as if the Hungarians could be held clearly responsible for the events, and although in the meantime sobriety has gained the upper hand, increasingly large forces are trying to repair what by now is almost irreparable. Public mood continues to be unfavorable, dialogue between the two sides continues to stagger, finger pointing continues.... Not everyone acquiesced to the idea that was stressed by responsible factors among Hungarians from the beginning: Conflicts may be resolved and dissolved only by accepting democratic principles, and only on the basis of such principles. What do we do from here on? This is the issue that preoccupies Hungarians, as well as sober-minded Romanians who want to build a democracy, because it is obvious that the path of further confrontation cannot be travelled, and that it not only fails to produce results, but also causes damage to the entire country, to Romania's international prestige.

In essence, this is the issue we wanted to discuss with Karoly Kiraly, vice chairman of the Provisional National Unity Council. We spoke with him the last time on 22 March, during the most difficult moments. Many questioned his position and role before and during the events.

[ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO] Mr. Vice Chairman, a new situation has presented itself as a result of the tragic events in Marosvasarhely. At a certain moment it appeared that the waves would clash above our heads, the heads of Hungarians in Romania. This is because it appeared as almost clear that we would be held responsible for starting the conflict; they questioned our elementary rights. True, one could also hear more sober voices, among them the words of the head of state. They viewed the issue in a more complex form. But this was not the typical attitude, moreover, many cast doubt upon Mr. Iliescu's words.

[Kiraly] I believe that initially the anti-Hungarian campaign was successful because most of the country's populace was incorrectly informed about the substance of just minority demands, and the populace was not informed about the chronology of events in Marosvasarhely, about forces which continue to stay in the background, which incited the conflicts, and which started the explosive events. One must understand however, that a tactic like this which builds on misinformation cannot lead to results, and that sooner or later, sober minds will gain the upper hand. All of this has already taken place, even though we have not achieved true and full acquiescence. The appointed governmental committee performed well in every respect, and so did police organs that were ordered to the scene. Although it is difficult to persuade the misled masses to recognize the truth, it has been revealed already that the already mentioned committee's report to the Provisional National Unity Council will reveal the details and will establish responsibility; moreover, it will do so truthfully. Incidentally, an increasing number of parties are taking part in the investigation. In the end this may prevent a situation in which this issue is made the centerpiece of the election campaign, and render the resolution of the nationality issue a matter subject to bargaining among the parties. Just now, Jozsef Boda of the Labor Party and Serghei Mesaros of the National Democratic Party are joining the committee in its work.

[ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO] Despite this fact I think it is unavoidable that the fate of minorities, the way the nationality issue should be resolved, will become one of the chief topics in the election campaign.

[Kiraly] The minority issue would have become the subject of debate in any event, except perhaps as a less passionate subject than what we may count on in the aftermath of Marosvasarhely. That is, if we acknowledge that the nationalities issue is one of the cornerstones of our young and evolving democracy, none of the parties can pass over alternative solutions without saying something. I must say that this is precisely the question and the answer which will permit us to assess how one or another party perceives democracy.... Democracy is not a matter that must be declared, and democracy is not being realized if I say that democracy has been born. This is a lengthy process which must be built into every field of life, in the economy, in society, in political life, in culture, and in other fields. It will take an equally lengthy process before we learn to listen to each other, to be tolerant toward each other and to each other's views, before we recognize that a person or persons may think and want things differently. Above all, we must abandon the use of force, and this is very difficult after so many years of dictatorship! And here I am referring not only to physical force, but also to the forcing of perceptions and thoughts upon others.

[ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO] Even if it began with bloodshed, and even if to some extent the election campaign stalled, we, as Hungarians must pay far-reaching attention to these events, and must search for

ways that lead toward democracy. Moreover, we must do so under the given circumstances with political wisdom, appropriate diplomatic steps, and an appropriate degree of flexibility. Also, we must not forget that the other Hungarian parties were able to join the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ] in the election campaign at a relatively late date, because events required the commitment of their energies. At the same time, the RMDSZ and the rest of the parties must fight the image of Hungarians that was artificially created by part of the mass media.

[Király] Most parties, and thus the Front and the historic parties, conducted political discourse prior to the start of the elections so as to win votes, or at least so that they would not lose votes. In essence, every move and every statement they made served to strengthen their respective positions. It is my view that the Hungarians did not fall behind in this regard either; after all, the organizational work done by the RMDSZ, its organizational buildup and the struggle it initiated for our rights, also served this purpose, albeit indirectly. Marosvásárhely represents a certain break in this process, mainly in the dispersion areas where perhaps the mood of terror intimidated some. It is precisely for this reason that we must avoid renewed confrontation, we must not respond to provocation, and in order to do so we must know our situation and our opportunities very well. Historical experience, the present tensions which still have not been extinguished, remind us to consider the opportunities that are available to us. This certainly would not mean that even a single party should surrender our just demands. That would be a very great mistake. Instead, considering our available opportunities should mean that we are weighing every step we take, every decision we make, and that we have taken their potential immediate effects into consideration. I personally, for example, do not feel that at present it is appropriate for the RMDSZ to hold its congress in Nagyvarad [Oradea] where there is a potential for external disturbing factors to involve themselves in the workings of the RMDSZ. The RMDSZ today needs a calm work atmosphere in order to make its decisions. Whether Nagyvarad is able to provide such an atmosphere is questionable, however. It would be worth pondering the proposal according to which Csíkszereda, Székelyudvarhely [Romanian names unknown], or even Bucharest should be the scene of the congress. I personally, as a member of the RMDSZ advisory body, feel that Csíkszereda would be the ideal place. The needed conditions may come about, may be secured there, in order to allow successful completion of the work, to allow emphasis to be laid on substantive debate, and to allow all disturbing circumstances to be excluded.

[ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO] As long as you have mentioned preparations for the congress, I would also mention the fact that this newspaper has published the basic documents of the RMDSZ, the Bylaws, and the Proposed Program. These are now the subjects of public

debate. Anyone has the right to express an opinion in regard to these, and quite obviously, you are among those who may comment.

[Király] I believe that both the Bylaws and the Proposed Program are good. One could argue of course about one or another point. Above all, I would urge that we not permit the events of the recent past to interfere with this debate. These events should not prompt anyone to make concessions insofar as the rights we are supposed to win are concerned. These rights, the protection of rights, should be appropriately stressed in these documents, even if we cannot place these in time, if we cannot perceive winning these rights in time. These documents do not pin down our tasks and goals for tomorrow; they do so in the long term.... And in this relation one should also know that rights which have been left unspoken and have not been asked for and demanded may not ever be enforced. Both documents may be changed, but we should not change parts which deal with the perspectives. In my view the main lesson to be learned from the March events is that we must not surrender our rights, but must render our request on better foundations, that these must be presented to the other side with proper explanation, and by avoiding misunderstandings. In this way political maneuvers may be avoided, and we may deflate the arguments of those who want to bar these rights by using false arguments. Perhaps it is because of this view I hold that they tried to stigmatize me as an extremist, even at an RMDSZ conference, I hear, at which I should have been present as long as they were talking about me. To call Suto, Tokes, Domokos, or even Király extremists is not only irresponsible in my view, but it constitutes the revival of the old Stalinist methods. As far as I know, I never represented, never voiced, an extremist view, just as others did not either; I only stood up for the enforcement of our individual and collective rights. Moreover, I did so in the spirit of the documents published by the RMDSZ, verbatim, one could say. Because what is extreme about stressing the right to use one's language? One cannot and must not surrender such matters. And the fact that I do not agree with everything? This is true, but at the same time this is a different issue. With regard to a few issues, my opinion does not correspond with opinions held by others. Thus, for example, I profess that the opportunity for pluralism must not be denied to Hungarians in Romania, meaning the existence of several political parties. Hungarians should also be able to have several parties, several organizations, which represent the interests of certain strata of the populace, such as youth, villagers, believers, etc. This certainly does not mean the scattering of our strength. On the contrary, they build unity based on being different. No single organization could commit itself to representing every interest of the Hungarians, and fighting for the achievement of every goal. Within their respective fields, this can be accomplished by the Smallholders Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Independent Hungarian party, the youth organizations, and so on. However, when it comes to the protection and enforcement of the individual and collective rights of

Hungarians, all these parties and organizations must find a common denominator, they must support each other, and they must cast their votes for each other's candidates. It creates a problem, however, if we want to force our opinion, if someone wants to force his opinion upon others, other groupings. Accordingly, we should be more open.

[ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO] By now, the congress must speak its mind on all of this.

[Kiraly] Obviously, and not only with regard to this matter. It must also express its views as to how and who should lead this organization. One has to watch that no one is able to monopolize this organization, that there is no single chief who dictates. We need a leadership that filters decisions, one that enforces the collective wisdom, and above all, one that serves the interests of all Hungarians in Romania, and not only of part of the Hungarians. I would favor seeing a body composed of honorary chairmen at the RMDSZ helm, Andras Suto, Sandor Kanyadi, perhaps others next to Laszlo Tokes. In other words, people trusted by everyone, and who incorporate experience, wisdom, and a sense of responsibility. I would also assign a greater role to the advisory body. This body should not be appointed, but elected instead. In other words, it would become an institution to include experienced personalities who have proven their political maturity, who could provide appropriate advice to the managing presidium, and with whom the presidium would be obligated to consult. Under such circumstances the managing presidium would rather reconcile the activities, because no one should accept the responsibility of making decisions regarding the fate of more than two million Hungarians all by himself. Within the presidium I would expect to see the leaders of associated organizations and counties, and obviously the managing chairmen, in the interest of achieving united action. I would like to mention one more thing in this relation. I do not believe that members and officials of the former Central Committee [CC] should be mixed in with the leaders of this organization, because these CC members and officials may be subject to attack at any time, even if they resisted the old regime. We should manifest greater confidence toward youth, those under the age of 50, those who have proven themselves in recent months regarding their preparedness to act, of their wisdom, their tactical sense, their patriotism, and in general about their maturity. And so that no one who does not belong to the leadership should be elected into the leadership, I would suggest that we elect a nominating committee during the initial days of the congress, and that the nominating committee should publish the list of nominees in the press. In this way anyone's nomination could be objected to, and his fitness or unfitness could be made the subject of debate. We must guard ourselves against careerists, loose mouths, irresponsible elements, and anyone who could discredit our cause.

[ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO] Let us return to the election campaign, which we enter with a month's delay

due to the postponement the workings of the congress. After all, we can run candidates only after the congress.

[Kiraly] Determining who should become a candidate for election is very important. Only well known, respected people, who are able to represent our cause in a dignified manner, should be nominated. The RMDSZ must establish far-reaching cooperation with minority parties in this regard. This, I believe, is a logical, self-explanatory requirement. In other respects I am of the view that Hungarians, together with the rest of the minorities, should also nominate a presidential candidate. Not with the expectation that Romania's president will be a member of a nationality, of course, but out of tactical considerations. That is, as a result of the candidate's withdrawal we may become involved in the presidential election struggle, and in our favor, because thereafter we would support the candidate who actually advocates democracy.

[ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO] Although it is too early to ask this question: What do you expect the outcome of the presidential election to be? Who has what kinds of chances?

[Kiraly] Although immediately after the revolution Ion Iliescu was high on the politicians' top list, in recent times Radu Cimpeanu has come close to him. But a contest limited to the two of them is out of the question, because several political groupings have not announced themselves yet. Our job is to observe, above all, who is running with what kind of program, and mainly, how realistic such programs are, to what extent they may be implemented here and now. Not every promise has a realistic basis; the country's economy and social life cannot accept just any kind of potential change. Accordingly, let us be realistic. Let us not judge candidates only on the basis of promises. Let us not forget that we have no experience in free elections, in the manner in which an election campaign is to be conducted, and we do not always know those who show up with one or another program. Words fly away....

[ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO] Let us agree, then, that we will leave this question open, and that we will raise it again at a later date. And on behalf of our readers we thank you for this new conversation.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Final Resolution of Socialist Party Congress

90CH0034A Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech
19 Mar 90 p 3

[Resolution passed by the XXIV Congress of the Socialist Party]

[Text] Czechoslovakia is experiencing a democratic revolution set in motion by the students' and artists' demonstration against totalitarian power on the memorable day of 17 November 1989. The Republic and its citizens are returning to the ideals of democracy, humanity,

morals, and effective patriotism, embodied in our history by the imposing stature of our President and Liberator Tomas Garrigue Masaryk. After 40 years of oppression and disruption of all basic values of dignified human existence, we are heading toward free elections, guaranteed in the person of the president of the republic, Vaclav Havel, and the unswerving will of all honest citizens not to permit the return of totalitarian order. Our present actions are being watched with sympathy and hope by the whole democratic world.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Party [CSS] which through its memorable statement of 19 November 1989 so significantly helped arouse the public to decisively and definitively settle the score with a communist regime, which was the first party to propose the idea of a national dialogue and the creation of national alliance governments, and which during the past months took pains to ensure that the path to democracy will not be strayed from, is returning to its original roots, to the heritage and traditions of the national socialist movement that started in 1897. It is thus obligated to all who fought in its ranks to attain national and state independence, for democracy and progress during the First Republic, and for national freedom during the years of occupation, to all who tried to prevent the usurping of power by the communist party between 1945 and 1948, to all those who suffered in prison, or led half-lives after the communist putsch of 1948, to all who, during the hope-filled days of the Prague Spring in 1968, tried to break the power of the single party, to all those who under the difficult conditions of the past decades tried with honest intentions to preserve the existence of the party and its patriotic and democratic character for better days, which we all believed would come.

In the spirit of the democratic revolution of our nations and their aims, in the spirit of renewal of political traditions, the XXIV Congress of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, held in Prague from 16 to 18 March 1990, has passed the following resolutions:

1. In accord with the wishes of the members of all three branches of the National Socialist Movement—the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the National Social Party of Czechoslovakia, and the members of the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia from the period before 1948—and in accord with the resolution of the IV Congress of the National Social Party of Czechoslovakia, the Congress proclaims the unification of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party and the National Social Party of Czechoslovakia into a unified single party, to bear the name: the Czechoslovak Socialist Party.

2. The Congress elected Jiri Vyvadil, Doctor of Law, as the Chairman of the Party, Prof. Vladimir Krajina as Honorary Chairman of the CSS, as well as of the central organs of the Party, i.e., the Central Committee, Central Review Commission, and the Central Court of the Party.

3. It endorsed the statutes of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party with amendments, proposed by the Chairman of

the Proposal Commission, Dr. Krecek, and being verified by the Central Committee by drafting an organizational structure and the order of the proceedings, and the statute of the supreme court of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party.

4. It endorsed the CSS program for the free elections 1990 with amendments proposed by the Chairman of the Proposal Commission, and it expects this program to regulate the territorial organs of the party according to their needs. The XXIV Congress simultaneously charges the Central Committee with drafting a proposal for a complex program of the Party as well as for the free elections.

5. It commissioned the representatives of the Federal Assembly and members of the CSS with asserting the name of our Republic—the Republic of Czechoslovakia—in the highest legislative committee.

6. It expresses anger and extreme alarm at the way in which Czechoslovak television furnished information about the political parties at this time, in particular about the visit of Professor Vladimir Krajina in Czechoslovakia and about the course of our Congress. It charges the Chairman of the Party to express this opinion to the government of Czechoslovakia and the management of Czechoslovak television.

7. It supports the efforts of the leadership of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party and of Melantrich relating to the restitution of the property of the National Socialist Party and its publishing house Melantrich; at the same time it supports the efforts of the central council of the National Socialist Youth for a fair distribution of the Socialist Youth Association's property, in such a way that the newly emerging democratic youth organizations can operate under normal conditions.

8. It charges the Central Committee of the CSS to bestow on Josef Podsednik the highest Party honors in recognition of his services to the Party and to our community.

9. It charges the Central Committee of the CSS to ensure that civil honor is returned to all brothers and sisters who were unjustly persecuted by the previous regime.

10. It is making this statement to the broad public: Using democratic means, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party will strive for national and social justice for every citizen, and for his freer and more gratifying life. It will wage the election battle according to the principles of political communication and decency. It is offering help to all political parties, movements, and citizen's initiatives which avow true democracy—not only in words but also in deeds—in the common battle against any attempt to revive totalitarianism, and to follow a common path to a happy future for our beloved homeland—the Republic of Czechoslovakia.

Prague, 18 March 1990

Communist Tactics Said To Backfire

90CH0031A Prague *LIDOVE NOVINY* in Slovak
10 Mar 90 p 1

[Article by Ivan Hoffman: "Pyrrhic Victory of Dark Forces"]

[Text] I often ask myself how Communists can manage to march with such confidence from defeat to defeat. Even their victories always turn out to be Pyrrhic.

On Thursday, 1 March, an extraordinary piece of theater took place in the Slovak National Council. Unexpectedly, in addition to the deputies and newspaper reporters about 200 citizens also participated (in the gallery directly in the meeting hall and in the courtyard), who gave the discussions a dramatic quality with their individual exclamations and collective chants.

On the agenda was the approval of the state symbols of Slovakia, that is, name (Slovak Republic), state emblem, flag, and the Slovak anthem (first two verses of "Nad Tatrou sa blýska" [Lightning over the Tatra Mountains]). Members of the Stur society, who decided to take charge of the Slovak National Council meeting, obviously will not remember their participation happily. It so happened that they were joined by passengers from a mysterious bus, who were armed with pictorial propaganda among which a banner proclaiming "Long Live Sustr" was prominent, and these people artfully managed to get their pictures taken with members of the Stur society for the Communist PRAVDA.

The state symbols were easily approved in a voice vote as expected. But then came the effort to implement the agreement made at the round table of political parties and movements in Slovakia. The position of chairman of the Slovak National Council was to be vacated by R. Sustr, and Jan Budaj, representative of the Public Against Violence, was to succeed him in that function. The 65 Communists in the 150-member Slovak National Council were joined by other deputies, many obviously under the influence of an effective "street theatre"—in protesting against Jan Budaj. Rudolf Sustr was confirmed as chairman and J. Budaj became his deputy chairman.

This first serious political defeat of the Public Against Violence had as its consequence an unprecedented activation of the public, which on Tuesday, 6 March, filled the Square of the Slovak National Uprising in Bratislava for a rally under the slogan "Let us tell the truth."

The notorious dark forces managed to greatly boost the already flagging goodwill of the public toward the Public Against Violence. They also forced the coordinating center of the Public Against Violence to adopt a fundamental change in its current method of work: At the rally, a great ovation greeted Jan Budaj's statement that in the future the Public Against Violence intends to turn again directly to the public instead of manoeuvring in lobbies. The popularity of Jan Budaj increased considerably since his defeat in the Slovak National Council.

Hardly anyone in Slovakia doubts that the Communist have no chance in the elections. But it was a pleasant surprise that a lack of realism on their part can from time to time stimulate in tired citizens a renewed concern for things public. There are circumstances under which people will go out into the streets again, and let us hope that they will again demand the original ideals of democracy and freedom.

Protest Against Keeping Compromised CPCZ Members in Office

90CH0026B Prague *LIDOVE NOVINY* in Czech
17 Mar 90 p 5

[Article by Jan Hala: "How To Treat the Internationalists"]

[Text] Sometimes it seems to me that I just dreamt it all. All those past 42 years, and especially those last 20 years. Man has one human trait—he forgets very quickly and very easily. Is that a good or a bad trait? When I see the reactions of many people who suffered during the sad, present-day era of "Darkness" [reference to 17th-18th century Bohemia], and of those who with a kind of unquenchable malevolence vented their rage on them, it seems to me as if both camps were suffering from a voluntary and feigned loss of memory. Or am I to understand it as an attack of the gentle and peaceful Czech nature, some kind of characteristic willingness to forgive and reconcile?

The first group—which embraces democracy, humanism, and freedom—is willing to forget and forgive the other group for many things. This is manifested in a forbearance of almost titanic proportions, which the other side would never show, as, after all, it has been proving to us graphically for the past 40 years.

The other group, however, the evil minority, until recently the party of the powerful, controlling the entire nation through various coercive means, does not seem willing to merely step aside and give up forever those divine privileges of a superior class. This was signalled by many indications and the gatherings of devotees of the old order; according to one report, there was even a meeting several weeks ago, on the temporarily sovereign territory of the Soviet Central Army Group near Mlada Boleslav, of exponents of the State Security, People's Militias, Committee for Corrective Education, and similar good company to debate in all seriousness how to try and turn back the march of history by means of various provocations.

It seems as if the tentativeness with which the democratic regime is carrying out personnel changes—regrettably still only in some leading positions—is emboldening the lovers of the "Darkness". It takes one's breath away to think of the audacity with which the exponents of normalization and devoted flunkies of the International pushed their way in many places to the head of the Public Forums after 1970, and even as recently as late November 1989. We have enough proof

of that particularly in the media, where former "true Internationalists" in the Czechoslovak Press Bureau [CTK] and Czechoslovak radio, and faces so familiar on television, suddenly are trying to convince us of the opposite of what they used to preach during the past 20 years.

I am an eye witness as well as a victim of how 20 years ago progressive editors in the CTK were dispatched; they were given a choice by Comrade Chief Director Svercina: either to sign the so-called agreement to terminate employment within 3 months, or to let themselves be fired immediately on grounds of loss of confidence, according to the law passed for this purpose by the obedient Federal Assembly and not unreasonably called the "Nuremberg" law. The forbearance, shown by the democratic and almost too excessively "velvet" revolution toward those who participated in repressions of all kinds, is therefore entirely out of place now and looks paradoxical and comical. If, of course, it is in fact comical that at the head of the Public Forum in the CTK, for example, is comrade Brotanek, in 1968 a participant in the process of rebirth, and later an overly devoted follower of normalization elevated to the function of chief editor, and today at the head—in the Public Forum for a change, and still in a leading role in this so important medium. The deputy for business affairs of the central CTK director is still comrade Zmatlik, who was once the right hand man of the chairman of the director's secretariat, as I got to know him personally in that position at the time of my involuntary departure.

In view of the benevolence with which the chiefs of the Czechoslovak radio, television, and other mass media handle the morally unsuitable employees in kid gloves, it seems that the humane democratic revolution perhaps does not have the nerve to use the Labor Code and part with those who, by identifying themselves with normalization and Internationalism, have long ago lost the moral right to speak from the television screen or into the microphone, or to influence public opinion in other ways. A demonstration by several dozen social democrats, protesting on 8 March in front of the Czechoslovak Radio building against insufficient personnel changes, indicated that the public is annoyed with full justification by the continued presence of Internationalists and state security agents in such an important and easily misused medium.

It is said that poets are dreamers, but even we have teeth, as President Vaclav Havel said some time ago. I believe that it is not enough just to talk and perhaps show your teeth, but necessary to know how to use them forcefully—at the right time.

Mlynar's Views on Change to Democracy Challenged

90CH0026A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
17 Mar p 5

[Article by Lubos Dobrovsky: "Professor Mlynar Is Mistaken"]

[Text] Thanks to an unbelievable amount of tolerance on the part of LIDOVE NOVINY editors Hanak and

Zeman, professor Mlynar from Vienna continues his serial "Counsel and Consultations" which he initiated some time ago on Czechoslovak television. He is explaining to us again with a thoroughness worthy of Colonel Kraus von Zillergut [a dim-witted character given to tedious, obvious explanations in the book "Good Soldier Schweik"] what a ditch is.

With a dose of self-criticism, he admits that everyone sometimes missteps; nevertheless, in the spirit of his former television missteps he marches on across the eighth page of No. 19 of LIDOVE NOVINY, accompanied by Messrs Hanak and Zeman. We learn that there were other options for political action than the one which, as the good professor tells us, sanctified its undemocratic means by its ultimate goal, with which we, disregarding the advice from Vienna, toppled the totalitarian power. The good professor obviously would have preferred the option in which he, imported from Austria, would arrange certain compromises with Messrs Adamec and Urbanek, a certain pittance of freedom, which would not diminish the prestige of the Communist Party or the authority of the Moscow leadership which "was at a loss what to do" and so supported to the last minute those Czechoslovak normalizers who governed here for the past 20 years, propped up by the Soviet occupation and supported to the last minute by today's Moscow as well. The way we did it, that we did not wait for the good professor to negotiate for us what to do and how to do it, that we decided to share power even without Moscow's consent and without elections, that was and is, as Zdenek Mlynar sees it, "an obstacle to a conceptual implementation of well thought out, fundamental political and economic changes". And that is why, as he maintains, "a simplifying euphoria rules here, there is wishful thinking, and old habits are meshed with new objectives". If we also add to these evaluations, with which a conversation with professor Mlynar fairly overflows, the sentence that here "unfortunately sometimes more attention is concentrated on the uniforms of the Hrad guard than on the fact that trade unions are not functioning properly", I get the pessimistic impression that Prague simply is not Vienna, which, after all, is not any great revelation.

Professor Mlynar keeps giving us lessons about what should and what should not have happened, where we made mistakes and how we should have proceeded in order to pass his test in political science. He simply did not notice that we have been taking that test for at least the past 12 years prior to the revolution, that the power, which he sees from the distance lying helpless in the street, we have been weakening and disrupting and restricting and disquieting and embarrassing right here at home. That we have been struggling with those who held that power.

Professor Mlynar is mistaken if he thinks that we are not aware of how we conducted ourselves, by what means we overthrew the totalitarian power of the Communist

Party, where we were not democratic enough and where we perhaps erred. Particularly embarrassing is that part of the conversation in which we are lectured, as if in a seminar on political theory, about what pluralistic democracy is. If professor Mlynar had read Dr. Pithart, if he had acquainted himself with his address to the Czech National Council, if he had taken the trouble to acquaint himself with the memorandum of the Civic Forum which Jan Urban gave to the President, if he had heard Vaclav Havel's speech on Staromestske Namesti, if he would come to hear a debate at a meeting of the Civic Forum, in short, if professor Mlynar had followed the political life here and not his theories, he could have kept his lessons on "federation down to the townships" to himself.

It is in fact quite simple, professor Mlynar gives the impression that by overthrowing the totalitarian power of the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party] we were guilty of imprudence, and now we do not know which way to turn, and he has been telling us that for a long time. And now, moreover, we are committing the sin of self-idealization when we think that we liberated ourselves on our own; after all, there were circumstances. Certainly there were circumstances, there always are circumstances. The point is to take advantage of them, act according to them. That we did, not waiting for instructions from Vienna or from Moscow. We did it and therefore we shall bear the consequences. We took that responsibility upon ourselves. We have not and we shall not run away from it.

Skoda Managers, Minister Exchange Open Letters

Government's Policies Contested

90CH0017A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
3 Mar 90 p 6

[Letter to government officials V. Komarek, V. Dlouhy, and V. Klaus signed by Eng Jiri Bednar, Eng Vojtech Filip, Eng Jan Hrabec]

[Text] Esteemed Gentlemen,

We listen attentively to your speeches and reasoned thoughts, views on the need to suppress the technologically obsolescent, energetically demanding and ecologically damaging heavy industry. We appreciate the elegance and ease with which you sketch out the transition from a cumbersome producer monopoly to a flexible system of a modern social market economy of an advanced European civilization.

Allow us, the rank-and-file workers of the "production sphere" who share your views, cheer in support of them, yet who see things from a somewhat different angle, to say "a few sentences."

We are Skoda people. That is, employees of a "technologically obsolescent, energetically demanding and ecologically damaging" colossus which moreover is facing a

complex economic situation. We, its employees, are not responsible for this, at least not we alone. We are the typical product of a long-term economic policy, implemented for decades in a disciplined fashion. We turned almost all our profits and most write-offs over to the State so that we were left without means for even the maintenance of the already well-worn equipment. We showed discipline by investing billions in nuclear power generation at a time when none of us, including you personally, had an idea of what quagmire this field will get us into. With discipline we concentrated on technically perhaps less demanding products to CEMA countries. Now we are harvesting the fruits of this policy. We are standing on the imaginary starting line in thick baggy pants, with leaden leg irons that are the legacy of this policy. The runner's track leading to a market economy is for us strewn with the boulders and morasses of restructurization, requalification, changes in production programs and management systems. An ideal prerequisite for turning us into a couple of decent municipal services.

We do not want to live at others' expense. On the contrary, we want to contribute a share at least as large as others to the greater wealth of our society. Despite the difficulties cited above, we too have valuable assets. This is our tremendous potential of skilled hands and clever brains which has built up for generations; we have a work ethic, technical maturity of qualified heads, inventive creativity of hundreds of experts in a number of professions, and last but not least estimable technical and technological capacities. Nor is the name and trademark of Skoda something to be disregarded.

We too, along with other enterprises, have an interest in an optimal legislative delimitation of our future. We are therefore surprised to see that with the logic of your views there again emerges in the proposed draft of enterprise law a kind of a "hybrid" State enterprise whose management—supervisory board—consists of one-half State officials and one-half those representing the enterprise. What sense is there to this irrational organization of the entrepreneurial component one half of which consists of State employees lacking both the necessary knowledge of the enterprise and a sense of responsibility for its prosperity. How can such an enterprise operate in market conditions?

On the other hand we welcome the concept of a "self-managing enterprise" whose "entrepreneur" and administrator of national property is the employees' collective, that is, people vitally connected with its fate who will freely elect from their midst the best of the best to the entrepreneurial and representative body—the enterprise council. Twenty years ago we called it a Working People's Council. This top body will select and elect a top management reporting to it, and set the limits for its operations. Its ties with the State involve the law, the tax system and approval for links with foreign partners. This is the optimum arrangement permitting a variety of alternative forms of entrepreneurship.

We know of the fears that enterprise employees represented by their enterprise council will not know how to operate in an entrepreneurial fashion. May we counter this with the fact that "State officials" have already proven their incompetence? We have a historic opportunity to prove that the work collective is sufficiently tied to its enterprise, by long-term ties often even through generations, that it is sufficiently wise and prudent to exercise responsibility in electing its representatives to the entrepreneurial body and equal responsibility in handling the proceeds from the operation. As far as we know, this form of an entrepreneurial entity, neither State nor private, has not yet been established anywhere. Give us a chance to prove its vitality.

Esteemed Messrs Deputy Premiers and Mr Minister, we will gladly welcome you to Skoda, or accept any invitation to cooperate on the drafting of new legal statutes with the emerging association of self-managed enterprises of which we are the co-founders.

We wish you and your work every success.

Minister's Reply

90CH0017B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
10 Mar 90 p 3

[Text] Allow me to express a sincere appreciation of the fact that the citizens of our Republic, regardless of their standing in society, display great interest in the future of our economy. This is shown by the hundreds of letters I get every day. This concern over the issue emerges also from the open letter in LIDOVE NOVINY of 3 March, in which three engineers from Skoda addressed members of the Government. Precisely because our people are capable of adopting an informed position on the development of our economy I have the greatest hope that the transformation of our economy into a prosperous economic system will ultimately be a success.

The job of the Government and other constitutional bodies is to open the way for this transformation. But the Government must avoid imprudent decisions which could block the way to those of whom we expect that they bring into our life entrepreneurship, responsibility and economic competitiveness. The easiest way of making such a mistake would be to adopt an unsuitable legal statute which would for a long time hinder rational conduct in our enterprise sphere. In this connection, similarly as you, I regard the law on State enterprises as an extremely important document; amending it or reformulating it entirely is a matter calling for great seriousness and caution.

As you probably know, there are considerable difficulties on the Government level with adopting new drafts of this law and I must confess that among others it is also our Ministry which, in concurrence with your views, has reservations about the proposed drafts. Our objections were always based on the argument that a new law on State enterprises is impossible to draft as long as no consensus has been reached, at least on the Government

level, about the future of the assets which today fall under the all-encompassing concept of socialist social ownership.

The discussions and irresolution which arose about these matters are understandable. We all must admit that the questions of ownership have found us somewhat unprepared, as only a few months ago they could not be seriously debated. This great taboo broke down after 17 Nov 89. For the slogan of our "Velvet Revolution" we chose "Return to Europe," inclusive of adopting an economic system characteristic of the civilized world, one which despite its shortcomings has proved that no better arrangement or economic relations has been invented so far.

In the Government declaration of 19 Dec 89 we clearly stated what we want: a market economy offering equal opportunities for various forms of ownership of the means of production. Thus on the one hand we will encourage entry of private enterprise into our economy, and on the other we will transform the existing nationalized form of ownership in industry, agriculture, and services as well.

We are well aware that a State sector exists in all economies and that in Europe it encompasses such producers of goods and services as for instance railroad and air transportation, health services, education, telecommunications, sometimes also mining or defense industries.

For all these enterprises and organizations, whether or not they generate their own revenues, it is characteristic that the State is responsible for their obligations. This makes them different from other companies with which a State enterprise occasionally finds itself in competition. So for instance in the health services it may come up against private entities offering virtually identical services, perhaps at a higher price, or with better quality. It is up to the consumer or client to judge the offerings and decide which is more acceptable to him.

Our law on State enterprises must be formulated so as to respect this picture of our future economic relations, and while it may need amendment from time to time it must be applicable to these future relations without further changes. At the same time this law must be applicable to the current situation as well, when all economic activities are in principle nationalized and carried on by State enterprises (or similar organizations).

Our draft law in its present form fails to meet these requirements.

The fable about the autonomy of a State enterprise and its self-financing is exposed best at the moment when the Finance Minister makes a mere hint—even the smallest one—about reducing subsidies from the State budget. Today's State enterprises were tied to that budget by a punitively strong umbilical cord of central planning and central price setting. The law on State enterprises should not conceal this fact with phrases about "à la complete

khozrazchet." Rather, it should proceed from the full truth about the relation between the founder and the enterprise, that is, the Ministry and the enterprise director, or even the enterprise director and the Finance Minister. This truth roughly says that given the present prices and today's laws it is in principle impossible to make an enterprise fully and unconditionally responsible for its economic results. We could repeat at infinitum the well-known disputes whether the responsibility falls on the enterprise director who is not properly managing the enterprise entrusted to him, or on the price-setting authority which failed to approve "correct prices," or the Finance Ministry which determined an unsuitable levy rate.

The new Government must and wants to eliminate the conditions leading to this negotiation between the center and the enterprises. I see the only way of accomplishing this in an institutional separation of the government from the economic sphere. This separation can not be achieved without a new determination of the relationship between ownership and the means of production.

This idea by itself does not yet mean privatization. And it cannot be by any stretch of imagination interpreted as returning national properties to their former owners, which will never be feasible or for that matter desirable. Our concept of defining ownership rights (and the subsequent privatization the extent of which will be determined by a subsequent political decision) means in principle only one thing: transfer of at least a part of the existing State enterprises to stock ownership and distributing a part of the shares of these enterprises among the population, or in some cases preferentially among the employees of these enterprises.

The details of this project obviously exceed the scope of this reply. But I felt the need to say at least a few words about this issue, in view of your notions about the significance of self-management for an effective operation of present-day State enterprises. In this respect however our positions are diametrically opposed.

In my view the so-called employee participation in management has a positive effect on operation only when these employees participate also in owning what they manage. The principle of a so-called self-management without participating in ownership is highly problematic and risky. The new Government should not, in my opinion, experiment with it. There are a number of reasons the most persuasive being based on historical experience with the very low efficiency of self-managed enterprises (for instance in Yugoslavia, as also elsewhere).

In the modern development of advanced market economies there nevertheless emerges as a very progressive feature a system of employee ownership shares. They gain ground especially where it may be expected that the employees will hold their enterprise's shares and not sell them to specialized private entrepreneurs.

But even if they sell, it is their decision and nothing is lost from the point of view of economic efficiency. If they hold on to the shares, there is no form of "self-management" which is stronger. In this way the employees quite indisputably express their preferences. The decision is theirs and theirs alone. If they decide in favor of this "self-management" then they of course guarantee it by their own property and its future value.

HUNGARY

Election Results: Individual Districts, National State

Individual Voting Districts

90CF0057A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 10 Apr 90 pp 4-5

[Text] [Translator's note: In some voting districts more than three candidates were listed. In such districts the winner, and the candidates receiving the second and third largest number of votes are presented in the table. For some voting districts, the entire list of candidates, complete with their respective party affiliations, number of votes received, and percentage of votes acquired, is listed. Districts in which additional breakdown is provided are marked with an asterisk following the designation of the voting district.]

Key to Parties

FIDESZ	Association of Young Democrats
FKgP	Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Citizens Party
HVK	Patriotic Election Coalition
KDNP	Christian Democratic Peoples Party
MDF	Hungarian Democratic Forum
MNP	Hungarian Peoples Party
MSZMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party
MSZP	Hungarian Socialist Party
MSZDP	Social Democratic Party of Hungary
SZDSZ	Alliance of Free Democrats
IND	Independent Candidates
MISC	Miscellaneous Parties
MULTI	Nominated by Several Parties

Key to Miscellaneous Parties

[1]	Entrepreneurs' Party
[2]	Hungarian Independence Party
[3]	National Smallholders and Citizens Party
[4]	Independent Social Democratic Party
[5]	Alliance for the Villages and the Countryside Election Party
[6]	Agrarian Alliance

Key to Miscellaneous Parties (Continued)

[7]	"FEDISZ-Kiskunfelegyhaza, TEDISZ-Kiskunmajsa"
[8]	Hungarian Green Party
[9]	People of the East
[10]	Association of the Defenders of Nature and of Society
[11]	Party of Generations, Pensioners, and Families
[12]	Hungarian Cooperative and Agricultural Party

Key to Miscellaneous Parties (Continued)

[13]	Independent Hungarian Democratic Party
[14]	Social Democratic Party of Hungarian Gypsies
[15]	Freedom Party
[16]	Somogy Christian Coalition
[17]	Sacred Crown Society
[18]	Party for a Hungarian Countryside

Budapest

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1	Banffy, Gyorgy			MDF	16,238	44.26
		Dornbach, Dr. Alajos		SZDSZ	15,404	41.99
			Vitanyi, Ivan	MSZP	5,040	13.73
2	Zsigmond, Attila			MDF	16,077	45.61
		Eorsi, Matyas		SZDSZ	14,325	40.64
			Bubla, Gyula	MSZP	4,846	13.74
3	Siklos, Csaba			MDF	13,187	42.57
		Levay, Dr. Bela		SZDSZ	12,491	40.33
			Orosz, Dr. Sandor	MSZP	5,292	17.08
4	Sarossy, Laszlo			MDF	14,862	52.24
		Ivanyi, Gabor		SZDSZ	10,188	35.81
			Kelen, Dr. Laszlo	MSZP	3,395	11.93
5	Fekete, Dr. Gyula			MDF	11,717	50.15
		Meszaros, Dr. Istvan		SZDSZ	11,643	49.84
6	Torok, Dr. Ferenc			SZDSZ	10,161	49.25
		Inczeft, Istvan		MDF	7,868	38.14
			Naszadi, Ferenc	FKgP	2,600	12.60
7	Schamschula, Dr. Gyorgy			MDF	12,869	43.35
		Tamas, Gaspar Miklos		SZDSZ	12,131	40.87
			Szabo, Lajos Matyas	MSZP	4,680	15.76
8	Katona, Kalman			MDF	14,095	55.33
		Szekhelyi, Jozsef		SZDSZ	11,375	44.66
9	Demszky, Dr. Gabor			SZDSZ	10,769	46.86
		Erhardt, Csaba		MDF	8,546	37.19
			Fillo, Pal	MSZP	3,662	15.93
10	Somogyi, Dr. Tamas			MDF	9,637	43.39
		Raj, Tamas		SZDSZ	9,274	41.75
			Szabo, Dr. Zoltan	MSZP	3,299	14.85
11	Haraszti, Miklos			SZDSZ	10,715	50.03
		Maroti, Laszlo Ferenc		MDF	10,700	49.96
12	Szabo, Dr. Ivan			MDF	9,591	50.57
		Tolgyessy, Dr. Peter		SZDSZ	9,372	49.42
13	Zacsek, Dr. Gyula			MDF	12,031	60.41
		Orban, Dr. Viktor		FIDESZ	7,882	39.48
14	Dobos, Laszlo			MDF	10,850	48.28

Budapest (Continued)

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
		Horvat, Antal		SZDSZ	7,609	33.85
			Egri, Dr. Tamas	MSZP	4,013	17.85
15	Csapodi, Dr. Miklos			MDF	15,261	58.15
		Fodor, Dr. Gabor		FIDESZ	10,990	41.84
16	Perjes, Dr. Gabor			MDF	15,973	58.37
		Koszeg, Ferenc		SZDSZ	11,391	41.62
17	Katay, Dr. Zoltan			MDF	10,163	48.27
		Bauer, Tamas		SZDSZ	8,301	39.43
			Monostori, Ildiko	MSZMP	2,587	12.28
18	Horvath, Bela			MDF	18,693	52.00
		Raday, Mihaly		SZDSZ	17,212	47.93
19	Darvas, Ivan			SZDSZ	11,495	43.65
		Csaji, Attila		MDF	8,886	33.74
			Kiss, Dr. Istvan	MSZP	5,953	22.60
20	Rajk, Laszlo			SZDSZ	8,995	42.82
		Beke, Kata		MDF	7,725	36.77
			Marosan, Gyorgy Jr.	MSZP	4,286	20.40
21	Magyar, Balint			SZDSZ	13,212	43.91
		Arva, Dr. Laszlo		MDF	12,288	40.84
			Vass, Dr. Csaba	MSZP	5,488	15.24
22	Peto, Dr. Ivan			SZDSZ	13,860	44.78
		Csepella, Imre		MDF	12,468	40.27
			Vanko, Magdolna	MSZP	4,624	14.94
23	Mecs, Imre			SZDSZ	11,306	43.97
		Hornok, Dr. Laszlo		MDF	10,302	40.60
			Siklosi, Attila	MSZP	4,103	15.95
24	Palotas, Janos			MDF	15,774	54.65
		Veg, Gabor		SZDSZ	13,089	45.34
25	Balla, Dr. Gabor			MDF	11,795	43.68
		Szent-Ivanyi, Istvan		SZDSZ	11,258	41.69
			Ruttner, Dr. Gyorgy	MISC [4]	3,947	14.61
26	Denes, Janos			MDF	9,858	44.69
		Fedak, Zoltan		SZDSZ	8,561	38.81
			Katona, Dr. Bela	MSZP	3,638	16.49
27	Szeleczy, Dr. Zoltan			MDF	12,123	53.21
		Somogyi, Dr. Janos		SZDSZ	10,657	46.76
28	Fodor, Dr. Andras Attila			MDF	13,029	45.55
		Kohalmi, Istvan		SZDSZ	11,261	39.37
			Fejes, Istvan	MSZP	4,311	15.07
29	Vizy, Dr. Bela			MDF	10,015	43.86
		Balogh, Marta		SZDSZ	9,626	42.16
			Reger, Antal	MSZP	3,191	13.97

Budapest (Continued)

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
30	Gyurko, Dr. Janos			MDF	6,291	51.00
		Szasz, Tamas		SZDSZ	6,044	48.89
31	Lotz, Dr. Karoly			SZDSZ	7,434	49.01
		Homoki, Geza		MDF	5,711	37.65
			Csaba, Peter	MSZP	2,021	13.32
32	Meszaros, Dr. Peter			MDF	10,399	52.59
		Nemeth, Zsolt		FIDESZ	9,373	47.40

Baranya County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Pecs	Andrasfalvy, Dr. Bertalan			MDF	9,290	42.89
		Varga, Dr. Levente		SZDSZ	7,761	36.67
			Galbats, Andras	FKgP	4,113	19.43
2 Pecs	Pap, Andras			MDF	10,922	45.93
		Getto, Jozsef		SZDSZ	9,209	38.72
			Szili, Dr. Katalin	MSZP	3,647	15.33
3 Pecs	Bretter, Zoltan			SZDSZ	10,344	49.48
		Mednyanszky, Dr. Sandor		MDF	7,556	36.14
			Vonyo, Dr. Jozsef	MSZP	3,003	14.36
4 Komlo	Hoppa, Dr. Jozsef			MDF	8,811	48.61
		Fekete, Gedeon		SZDSZ	5,390	29.73
			Timaffy, Dr. Istvan	FKgP	3,924	21.64
5 Mohacs	Wekler, Dr. Ferenc			MULTI	15,394	57.22
		Biro, Ferenc		MDF	11,509	42.77
6 Siklos	Nagy, Ferenc Jozsef			FKgP	8,200	42.27
		Heindl, Dr. Peter		MULTI	7,858	40.50
			Krebsz, Janos	MDF	3,341	17.22
7 Szigetvar	Kapronczay, Dr. Jozsef			MDF	5,123	37.09
		Molvay, Dr. Laszlo		SZDSZ	4,570	33.09
			Szomor, Ferenc	FKgP	4,116	29.80

Bacs-Kiskun County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Kecskemet	Jozsa, Dr. Fabian			MDF	10,037	60.94
		Sandor, Dr. Laszlo		SZDSZ	4,438	26.94
			Kalmar, Jozsef	FKgP	1,995	12.11
2 Kecskemet*	Debreczeni, Dr. Jozsef			MDF	10,709	50.93
		Toth, Tamas		SZDSZ	4,265	20.28
			Bruszel, Dr. Laszlo	MSZP	1,833	8.71
3 Tiszakecske	Kanya, Gabor			MDF	7,430	54.61
		Manyoki, Lajos		FKgP	3,425	25.17
			Frigyesy, Dr. Ferenc	SZDSZ	2,750	20.21

Bacs-Kiskun County (Continued)

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
4 Kunszentmiklos	Faddi, Jozsef			FKgP	6,962	40.67
		Bodi, Szabolcs		MDF	6,432	37.57
			Bak, Dr. Istvan	MISC [6]	3,722	21.74
5 Kiskunfelegyhaza	Fekete, Pal			MDF	6,506	38.51
		Reczi, Dr. Laszlo		SZDSZ	5,067	30.00
			Hollo, Dr. Denes		3,115	18.44
6 Kiskoros	Pohankovics, Dr. Istvan			FKgP	10,546	59.77
		Morvai, Ferenc		IND	7,096	40.22
7 Kalocsa	Andriska, Dr. Geza			SZDSZ	7,712	39.72
		Barth, Dr. Janos		MDF	6,753	34.78
			Kosa, Andras	FKgP	4,947	25.48
8 Kiskunhalas	Horvath, Dr. Laszlo			FKgP	8,649	58.52
		Toth, Zoltan		SZDSZ	6,129	41.47
9 Baja	Nagy, Andras			SZDSZ	9,242	40.26
		Peterfi, Dr. Tamas		MDF	8,404	36.61
			Dancsa, Balint	FKgP	5,308	23.12
10 Bacsalmás	Karsai, Peter			MDF	6,950	40.65
		Sztantics, Dr. Peter		SZDSZ	5,164	30.20
			Franek, Dr. Bela	FKgP	4,963	29.14

Bekes County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Bekescsaba	Szokolay, Zoltan			MDF	12,091	53.39
		Denes, Zoltan		SZDSZ	10,552	46.60
2 Gyula	Kadar, Peter			SZDSZ	7,960	41.17
		Liptak, Dr. Andras		MDF	6,896	35.67
			Tar, Ferenc	FKgP	4,475	23.14
3 Bekes	Pasztor, Dr. Gyula			FKgP	8,344	51.93
		Csurka, Istvan		MDF	7,722	48.06
4 Szeghalom	Pelcsinszky, Dr. Boleszlav			SZDSZ	6,603	43.46
		Kazinczy, Istvan		FKgP	4,495	29.59
			Lehoczki, Mihaly	MSZP	4,092	26.93
5 Szarvas	Deme, Zoltan			IND	14,669	53.55
		Hunya, Lajos		FKgP	3,305	12.79
			Fekete, Janos	IND	2,438	8.90
6 Oroshaza	Varga, Zoltan			MDF	10,769	42.13
		Domokos, Tibor		FKgP	10,609	41.50
			Olajos, Imre	MSZP	4,183	16.36
7 Mezokovacs-haza	Rempert, Dr. Katalin			MDF	11,435	63.71
		Bakos, Istvan		FKgP	6,512	36.28

Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Miskolc	Balazsi, Tibor			MDF	9,604	52.21
		Latran, Bela		SZDSZ	6,000	32.81
			Toth, Pal	MSZP	2,663	14.67
2 Miskolc	Balas, Dr. Istvan			MDF	11,607	51.42
		Matyi, Dr. Laszlo		SZDSZ	6,650	29.46
			Tompa, Sandor	MSZP	4,313	19.10
3 Miskolc	Mile, Lajos			MDF	10,546	61.94
		Timar, Eva		SZDSZ	3,986	23.41
			Korinthus, Katalin	MSZP	2,493	14.64
4 Miskolc	Kiss, Dr. Gyorgy			MDF	11,293	61.21
		Bodo, Dr. Pal		SZDSZ	7,154	38.78
5 Ozd	Bardos, Balazs			FKgP	5,884	37.31
		Koos, Csaba		SZDSZ	5,148	32.64
			Meszaros, Dr. Miklos	FIDESZ	4,736	30.03
6 Sajoszentpeter	Miklos, Arpad			MDF	4,668	38.60
		Samu, Istvan		SZDSZ	4,377	36.19
			Maczo, Istvan	FKgP	3,047	25.19
7 Kazincbarcika	Toth, Istvan			MDF	5,942	40.94
		Csorba, Piroska		SZDSZ	5,486	37.80
			Kiraly, Dr. Balint	MSZP	3,084	21.25
8 Edeleny	Hatvani, Dr. Zoltan			SZDSZ	6,040	40.47
		Szilagyi, Adolf		MISC [6]	5,221	34.98
			Domokos, Dr. Jozsef	MDF	3,661	24.53
9 Encs	Maczo, Dr. Agnes G. Nagy			MDF	6,055	37.36
		Kiss, Dr. Gyula		FKgP	5,434	33.53
			Toth, Andras	KDNP	4,715	29.09
10 Satoraljaiuhely	Nagy Bozsoky, Dr. Jozsef			MDF	8,479	44.18
		Rusznak, Miklos		KDNP	6,349	33.31
			Nemeth, Karoly	MSZP	4,318	22.50
11 Szerencs*	Nemeth, Miklos			IND	17,458	59.96
		Toth, Dr. Albert		MDF	2,674	9.18
			Pelsoczi, Laszlo	FKgP	2,358	8.71
12 Leninvaros	Toth, Imre Laszlo			MDF	7,753	47.20
		Zabos, Dr. Geza		SZDSZ	6,000	36.53
			Bali, Istvan	MSZP	2,671	16.26
13 Mezokovesd	Pesti, Ferenc			MDF	13,373	69.08
		Dobos, Dr. Gyula		FKgP	5,985	30.91

Csongrad County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Szeged*	Raffay, Dr. Erno			MDF	16,631	53.42
		Rozsnai, Dr. Balint		SZDSZ	3,774	12.12
			Halasz, Mrs. Anna Novak	MSZMP	2,281	7.82

Csongrad County (Continued)

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
2 Szeged*	Kiraly, Zoltan			MDF	25,261	65.47
		Janko, Attila		SZDSZ	2,647	6.86
			Veres, Csaba	FKgP	2,121	5.49
3 Szeged	Bratinka, Dr. Jozsef			MDF	12,779	65.79
		Rozsa, Edit		SZDSZ	4,664	24.07
			Annus, Jozsef	MSZMP	1,927	9.94
4 Csongrad	Eke, Dr. Karoly			IND	11,618	65.61
		Harmath, Mrs. Istvan		MDF	4,202	23.73
			Pinter, Istvan	FKgP	1,887	10.65
5 Szentes	Papp, Dr. Lehel Gyorgy			MDF	7,407	44.26
		Laszlo, Bela		SZDSZ	4,451	27.95
			Imre, Karoly	FKgP	4,423	27.78
6 Hodmezovasarhely	Szabo, Dr. Lajos			FKgP	13,043	60.27
		Greza, Dr. Ferenc		MDF	8,597	39.72
7 Mako	Mihaly, Dr. Zoltan			MDF	6,916	41.54
		Kertesz, Dr. Dezso		SZDSZ	5,192	31.18
			Santha, Dr. Sandor	FKgP	4,540	27.27

Fejer County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Szekesfehervar	Mozs, Jozsef			SZDSZ	11,578	51.70
		Szabo, Sandor Andras		MDF	10,815	48.29
2 Szekesfehervar	Horvath, Dr. Miklos			MDF	10,253	45.65
		Vilagosi, Dr. Gabor		SZDSZ	9,268	41.26
			Mach, Gyula	MISC [1]	2,939	13.08
3 Dunaujvaros	Illessy, Istvan			MDF	8,881	44.54
		Felix, Dr. Istvan		SZDSZ	7,130	35.75
			Kovacs, Dr. Pal	MSZP	3,928	19.70
4 Gardony	Szilasi, Gyorgy			MDF	6,898	43.40
		Bako, Dr. Bela		SZDSZ	5,851	36.81
			Meszaros, Pal	FKgP	3,143	19.77
5 Mor	Zsebok, Lajos			MDF	8,606	43.34
		Szagmeiszter, Dr. Pal		SZDSZ	6,638	33.43
			Horvath, Jozsef	FKgP	4,612	23.22
6 Sarbogard	Hajdu, Zoltan			SZDSZ	7,587	51.32
		Palasti, Vince		MDF	4,228	28.60
			Szabo, Gyorgy	FKgP	2,966	20.06
7 Bicske	Varsanyi, Andras			MDF	7,158	42.23
		Meszaros, Andras		SZDSZ	6,924	40.85
			Izing, Istvan	FKgP	2,866	16.91

Gyor-Sopron County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Gyor	Medgyasszay, Dr. Laszlo			MDF	9,980	43.10
		Buky, Dorottya		SZDSZ	8,182	35.83
			Szabo, Dr. Janos	FKgP	4,992	21.55
2 Gyor	Bako, Lajos			MDF	14,493	54.25
		Kolozsvary, Erno		SZDSZ	12,218	45.74
3 Gyor	Rab, Dr. Karoly			SZDSZ	12,096	47.58
		Bajtai, Dr. Andras		MDF	9,935	39.08
			Bako, Dr. Ferenc	MSZP	3,388	13.32
4 Mosonmagyaróvár	Szekelyhidi, Dr. Laszlo			MDF	9,698	43.81
		Finta, Jozsef Otto		SZDSZ	8,285	37.30
			Pap, Dr. Janos	FIDESZ	4,180	18.88
5 Csoma	Balogh, Janos			SZDSZ	11,018	50.70
		Turi, Laszlo		FKgP	10,711	49.29
6 Kapuvár	Horvath, Dr. Tivadar			SZDSZ	10,113	40.82
		Pozsgai, Dr. Jenő		KDNP	7,971	32.18
			Bakody, Dr. Gyula	FKgP	6,686	26.99
7 Sopron	Szajer, Dr. Jozsef			FIDESZ	13,124	50.41
		Karpati, Dr. Laszlo		MDF	12,907	49.58

Hajdu-Bihar County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Debrecen	Fejes, Attila			MDF	11,967	59.68
		Tabajdi, Gyorgy Pal		SZDSZ	8,032	40.31
2 Debrecen	Gali, Dr. Akos			MDF	8,275	42.93
		Bertha, Dr. Zoltan		SZDSZ	7,982	41.41
			Orosz, Dr. Istvan	MSZP	3,018	15.65
3 Debrecen	Mozes, Dr. Mihaly			SZDSZ	11,050	44.38
		Erdo, Dr. Gyula		MDF	10,291	41.33
			Bojan, Dr. Ferenc	MSZP	3,553	14.27
4 Hajdúhadháztéglás	Komor, Sandor			MDF	4,036	30.19
		Arany, Janos		FKgP	4,026	30.11
			Alexa, Janos	MSZP	1,348	10.08
5 Berettyóújfalú	Sapi, Jozsef			MDF	7,119	52.94
		Bank, Dr. Attila		FKgP	6,328	47.05
6 Puspokladány	Szuross, Dr. Matyas			MSZP	6,443	43.24
		Farkas, Dezso		MDF	4,677	31.38
			Farkas, Lajos	FKgP	3,780	25.36
7 Hajdúszoboszló	Sovago, Dr. Laszlo			MDF	7,630	48.09
		Nagy, Dr. Sandor		IND	5,198	32.76
			Domokos, Janos Jr.	SZDSZ	3,035	19.13
8 Balmazújváros	Zsupos, Lajos			MDF	5,391	39.88
		Kemeny, Istvan		FKgP	4,188	30.98
			Csige, Jozsef	MSZP	3,937	29.12

Hajdu-Bihar County (Continued)

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
9 Hajduboszormeny	Molnar, Dr. Tibor			SZDSZ	6,120	42.16
		Olah, Dr. Imre		—	4,665	32.14
			Almasi, Dr. Tibor	HVK	3,728	25.63

Heves County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Eger	Szarvas, Bela			MDF	9,002	40.44
		Novak, Dr. Rudolf		SZDSZ	8,976	40.32
			Lukacs, Dr. Tamas	KDNP	4,280	19.22
2 Petervasara and vicinity	Kelemen, Jozsef			MDF	6,401	41.06
		Horvath, Laszlo		SZDSZ	5,919	39.97
			Chikan, Dr. Zoltan	KDNP	3,268	20.96
3 Gyongyos	Komenczi, Bertalan			MULTI	10,760	50.13
		Reisz, Istvan		KDNP	10,703	49.86
4 Hatvan	Baranyai, Dr. Miklos			MDF	8,338	50.04
		Bajusz, Dr. Imre		SZDSZ	5,168	31.01
			Molnar, Dr. Lajos	KDNP	3,155	18.93
5 Heves	Pongracz, Jozsef			MDF	6,112	44.30
		Bossanyi, Laszlo		KDNP	4,092	29.66
			Nagy, Mrs. Magdolna Kovacs	SZDSZ	3,590	28.02
6 Fuzesabony	Elek, Istvan			MDF	6,206	44.72
		Pasztor, Dr. Jozsef		KDNP	3,990	28.75
			Horvath, Aniko	SZDSZ	3,681	26.52

Jasz-Nagykun-Szolnok County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Jaszbereny	Kiss, Dr. Zoltan			SZDSZ	6,616	44.43
		Petho, Dr. Laszlo		MDF	4,252	28.55
			Szigeti, Istvan	FKgP	4,021	27.00
2 Jaszapati	Mizsei, Bela			FKgP	4,918	36.34
		Kecskes, Dr. Akos		MDF	4,896	36.18
			Torok, Sandor	HVK	3,717	27.47
3 Szolnok	Halasz, Istvan			MDF	6,451	45.79
		Hortobagyi, Zoltan		SZDSZ	5,183	36.79
			Posta, Zsolt	FKgP	2,454	17.41
4 Szolnok	Petronyak, Laszlo			MDF	8,836	42.90
		Fodor, Tamas		SZDSZ	7,066	34.32
			Kovacs, Tibor	MSZP	4,689	22.76
5 Kunszentmarion	Molnar, Istvan			MDF	4,867	37.28
		Kiss, Dr. Edit		SZDSZ	4,767	36.52
			Csontos, Dr. Miklos	FKgP	3,419	26.19
6 Mezotur	Toth, Dr. Albert			MDF	5,276	34.18

Jasz-Nagykun-Szolnok County (Continued)

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
		Arvai, Gyula		SZDSZ	3,987	25.83
			Draskovits, Denes	MSZP	3,384	21.92
7 Kunhegyes	Szabo, Dr. Lajos			MDF	7,013	44.62
		Dogei, Imre		FKgP	4,804	30.56
			Tolnai, Antal	SZDSZ	3,900	24.81
8 Karcag	Szabo, Dr. Janos			MDF	8,753	59.91
		Varga, Dr. Laszlo		FKgP	3,276	22.47
			Varga, Mihaly	FIDESZ	2,579	17.65

Komarom-Esztergom County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Tatabanya	Szalay, Gabor			SZDSZ	10,902	47.49
		Pordan, Jozsef		MDF	8,659	37.96
			Helmle, Dr. Laszlo	MISC [13]	3,248	14.23
2 Oroszlany	Kaman, Dr. Attila			MDF	11,543	55.89
		Freud, Dr. Tamas		SZDSZ	6,770	32.78
			Hanko, Laszlo	FKgP	2,337	11.31
3 Tata	Deak, Sandor			SZDSZ	8,895	49.08
		Markus, Dr. Janos		FKgP	5,701	31.52
			Sera, Dr. Janos	KDNP	3,488	19.28
4 Almasfuzito	Toth-Kurucz, Janos			MDF	11,250	54.44
		Solecki, Szilard		SZDSZ	5,984	28.95
			Bojthe, Andras	MSZP	3,429	16.59
5 Esztergom	Arato, Dr. Geza			SZDSZ	10,167	47.38
		Horvath, Zsolt		MDF	5,870	27.35
			Ugrin, Dr. Emese	KDNP	5,421	25.26

Nograd County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Salgotarjan	Speidl, Zoltan			MDF	8,692	44.11
		Gusztos, Istvan		SZDSZ	6,665	33.82
			Szilagyi, Dr. Tibor	MSZMP	4,345	22.05
2 Paszto	Toth, Sandor			KDNP	5,551	35.62
		Novak, Dr. Laszlo		SZDSZ	5,191	33.31
			Kadarkuti, Jozsef	MDF	4,839	31.05
3 Szecseny	Juhasz, Peter			KDNP	7,398	48.93
		Frisch, Oszkar		MDF	4,908	32.46
			Kakuk, Dr. Attila	SZDSZ	2,813	18.60
4 Balassagyarmat	Kovacs, Gabor			KDNP	6,957	37.14
		Hlacsok, Janos		SZDSZ	5,987	31.96
			Csekey, Dr. Laszlo	MDF	5,783	30.88

Pest County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Szob	Bogardi, Zoltan			MDF	8,573	49.29
		Meszaros, Dr. Gyula		KDNP	4,780	27.48
			Ormandy, Jozsef	SZDSZ	4,037	23.21
2 Vac	Katona, Tamas			MDF	11,039	62.72
		Vass, Istvan		SZDSZ	6,561	37.27
3 Dunakeszi	Kiss, Dr. Robert			SZDSZ	8,585	48.98
		Szigeti Toth, Janos		MDF	7,194	41.04
			Varga, Lajos	MSZP	1,747	9.96
4 Godollo	Roszik, Gabor			MDF	14,436	57.63
		Hajagos, Dr. Antal		SZDSZ	7,656	30.56
			Korosfoi, Laszlo	MSZP	2,957	11.80
5 Aszod	Becker, Dr. Pal			MDF	6,735	42.41
		Peter, Dr. Mihaly		KDNP	5,054	31.82
			Basa, Dr. Antal	IND	4,091	25.76
6 Nagykata	Farkas, Gabor			MDF	7,214	39.60
		Bodrogi, Mrs. Gyorgy		SZDSZ	6,607	36.27
			Hajnal, Dr. Karoly	FKgP	4,393	24.11
7 Monor	Torok, Dr. Gabor			MDF	10,968	49.53
		Jos, Dr. Mrs. Miklos		—	7,050	32.64
			Tenke, Dr. Sandor	IND	3,850	17.82
8 Erd	Kovacs, Dr. Laszlo			MDF	10,702	57.11
		Gyuresok, Jozsef		SZDSZ	4,869	25.98
			T. Meszaros, Andras	FIDESZ	3,167	16.90
9 Budaors	Javor, Karoly			MDF	10,145	59.67
		Szuhay, Peter		SZDSZ	6,855	40.32
10 Pilisvorosvar	Szauter, Rudolf			MDF	12,697	58.30
		Hajdufy, Miklos		SZDSZ	9,079	41.69
11 Szentendre	Szel, Dr. Peter			MDF	10,710	61.67
		Varhegyi, Sandor		FKgP	6,656	38.32
12 Szigetszentmiklos	Kuncze, Gabor			SZDSZ	9,949	50.55
		Fazekas, Almos		MDF	9,729	49.44
13 Rackeve	Vona, Dr. Ferenc			MDF	12,439	59.49
		Venczel, Mrs. Eva Czombos		SZDSZ	5,507	26.34
			Frank, Jozsef	FKgP	2,961	14.16
14 Dabas	Fodor, Dr. Istvan			IND	6,790	37.57
		Horvath, Istvan		FKgP	5,811	32.12
			Mala, Ferenc	SZDSZ	5,481	30.29
15 Cegled	Reti, Dr. Miklos			MDF	10,086	53.04
		Suranyi, Dr. Dezso		SZDSZ	5,095	26.79
16 Nagykoros*	Kulin, Dr. Sandor			MDF	5,377	32.80
		Abraham, Dr. Tibor		SZDSZ	4,775	29.13
			Lakos, Dr. Laszlo	MSZP	3,123	19.05

Somogy County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Kaposvar	Kiraly, Bela			IND	11,198	59.95
		De Sorig, Tibor		MSZP	3,742	20.03
			Hegedus, Dr. Lajos	IND	3,737	20.00
2 Kaposvar	Tarjan, Dr. Mrs. Laszlo			FKgP	11,914	60.31
		Pasztohy, Andras		MSZP	7,838	39.68
3 Siofok	Paris, Dr. Andras			SZDSZ	7,730	39.56
		Bakoczi, Gellert		FKgP	6,711	34.33
			Hazas, Dr. Jozsef	MSZP	5,097	26.08
4 Boglarielle	Gaal, Dr. Antal			MDF	10,913	54.52
		Horn, Gyula		MSZP	9,101	45.47
5 Marcali	Istvan, Jozsef			FKgP	12,027	66.51
		Suchmann, Dr. Tamas		MSZP	6,054	33.48
6 Nagyatad	Sipos, Dr. Imre			FKgP	6,804	39.80
		Nagyboeska, Tamas		MDF	6,409	37.49
			Beke, Laszlo	MSZP	3,880	22.69

Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Nyiregyhaza	Takacs, Dr. Peter			MDF	9,757	46.45
		Laborczi, Geza		SZDSZ	7,425	35.35
			Kosa, Ferenc	MSZP	3,821	18.19
2 Nyiregyhaza	Szilassy, Dr. Geza			MDF	8,957	46.49
		Lenti, Dr. Istvan		SZDSZ	6,082	31.57
			Baja, Dr. Ferenc	MSZP	4,225	21.93
3 Tiszavasvari	Varkonyi, Istvan			MDF	6,852	42.84
		Makkai, Laszlo		SZDSZ	5,634	35.22
			Berecz, Janos	MSZMP	3,507	21.92
4 Nagykallo	Kallay, Kristof			MULTI	7,856	46.52
		Kun, Dr. Bertalan		FKgP	6,447	38.17
			Gulyas, Jozsef	MISC [6]	898	5.81
5 Baktaloranthaza	Jakab, Ferenc			MDF	6,961	45.67
		Ivan, Dr. Erno		KDNP	3,605	23.65
			Balint, Pal	FKgP	1,588	10.41
6 Nyirbator	Szendrei, Dr. Laszlo			MDF	8,136	58.85
		Somos, Jozsef		KDNP	5,688	41.14
7 Kisvarda	Mezey, Dr. Karoly			MDF	7,745	46.84
		Kriveczky, Dr. Mrs. Bela		SZDSZ	3,206	19.39
			Revesz, Balazs	FKgP	3,203	19.37
8 Vasarosnameny	Szucs, Sandor M.			MDF	4,558	27.22
		Ivanyi, Tamas		SZDSZ	4,478	26.74
			Abrok, Imre	MISC [6]	2,240	13.37
9 Mateszalka	More, Dr. Laszlo			MDF	7,348	46.11
		Torgyan, Dr. Jozsef		FKgP	4,347	27.27

Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg County (Continued)

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
			Domotor, Istvan	SZDSZ	4,240	26.60
10 Fehergyarmat	Piros, Mrs. Ildiko Varga			MISC [6]	8,272	58.20
		Kavassy, Dr. Sandor		FKgP	5,941	41.79

Tolna County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Szekszard	Ternak, Dr. Gabor			MDF	12,641	47.86
		Polyak, Sandor		SZDSZ	8,080	30.59
			Janosi, Dr. Gyorgy	MSZP	5,691	21.45
2 Bonyhad	Figler, Janos			MDF	7,761	42.97
		Simony, Jozsef		SZDSZ	6,338	35.09
			Kacsor, Jozsef	FKgP	3,962	21.93
3 Dombovar	Barcza, Imre			SZDSZ	6,102	35.36
		Bea, Jozsef		KDNP	5,671	32.86
			Ohnmacht, Gyorgy	MDF	5,481	31.76
4 Paks	Horvath, Lajos			MDF	4,845	38.84
		Fazekas, Dr. Istvan		KDNP	3,020	24.21
			Radochay, Dr. Imre	MSZP	2,332	18.69
5 Tarnasi	David, Dr. Ibolya			MDi	7,013	48.74
		Csike, Gyorgy		FKgP	3,820	26.55
			Varga, Janos	HVK	3,553	24.69

Vas County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Szombathely	Hanko Farago, Dr. Miklos			SZDSZ	11,429	50.05
		Hende, Dr. Csaba		MDF	11,201	49.49
2 Szombathely	Bacsikai, Jenő			SZDSZ	11,357	50.84
		Adam, Karoly		MDF	10,980	49.15
3 Koszeg	Horvath, Vilmos			SZDSZ	12,448	54.97
		Kovacs, Dr. Arpad		KDNP	10,196	45.02
4 Sarvar	Gombos, Dr. Ferenc			MDF	10,168	42.05
		Monostori, Dr. Endre		SZDSZ	9,984	41.29
			Denes, Dr. Tibor	FKgP	4,027	16.65
5 Kormend	Meszaros, Bela			SZDSZ	14,751	52.52
		Fur, Lajos		MDF	13,335	47.47

Veszprem County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Ajka	Pusztai, Dr. Erzsébet			MDF	10,271	47.54
		Madai, Peter		SZDSZ	7,264	33.62
			Vilagosi, Dr. Gyorgy	FKgP	4,067	18.82
2 Balatonfured	Szabo, Tamas			MDF	9,391	54.23

Veszprem County (Continued)

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
		Szor, Gyula		SZDSZ	5,035	29.08
			Csonka, Imre	FKgP	2,888	16.68
3 Papa	Kover, Dr. Laszlo			MULTI	10,399	43.61
		Penzes, Dr. Tibor		MDF	9,030	37.86
			Janosa, Bela	FKgP	4,416	18.51
4 Tapolca	Csizmadia, Istvan			MDF	8,077	40.37
		Seöok, Janos		HVK	6,841	34.19
			Saary, Dr. Gyula	SZDSZ	5,086	25.42
5 Varpalota	Schmidt, Ferenc			MDF	10,177	47.93
		Huszar, Dr. Pal		SZDSZ	7,911	37.25
			Patonai, Dr. Peter	FIDESZ	3,145	14.81
6 Veszprem	Horvath, Dr. Balazs			MDF	8,033	55.99
		Schiszler, Dr. Lajos		SZDSZ	4,653	32.43
			Asztalos, Istvan	MSZP	1,659	11.56
7 Veszprem	Papp, Dr. Sandor			MDF	8,319	53.39
		Szelenyi, Zsuzsanna		FIDESZ	3,898	25.01
			Veress, D. Csaba	SZDSZ	3,363	21.58

Zala County

Voting District	Winner	Second	Third	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1 Zalaegerszeg	Szigethy, Dr. Istvan			SZDSZ	10,665	43.02
		Marx, Dr. Gyula		MDF	9,931	40.06
			Racz, Dr. Mrs. Lidia Karasz	MSZP	4,194	16.91
2 Nagykanizsa	Tarnoczky, Attila			MDF	10,028	44.22
		Solti, Karoly		SZDSZ	8,090	35.67
			Balogh, Dr. Ferenc	KDNP	4,556	20.09
3 Keszthely	Czoma, Dr. Laszlo			IND	11,960	56.19
		Villanyi, Pal		SZDSZ	4,779	22.45
			Csegey, Denes	MDF	4,544	21.35
4 Zalaszentgrot	Radics, Robert			MDF	11,565	45.72
		Ari, Miklos		SZDSZ	7,036	27.82
			Fekete, Dr. Istvan	KDNP	6,690	26.45
5 Lenti	Toth, Dr. Tihamer			MDF	11,373	42.97
		Palfi Dr. Denes		HVK	9,121	34.46
			Varga, Lajos	SZDSZ	5,970	22.55

Additional Breakdown of Results in Individual Districts

Bacs-Kiskun County, District 2 Kecskemet

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1. Debreczeni, Dr. Jozsef	MDF	10,709	50.93
2. Toth, Tamas	SZDSZ	4,265	20.28
3. Bruszei, Dr. Laszlo	MSZP	1,833	8.71
4. Sarkadi, Dr. Zsolt	FIDESZ	1,717	8.71
5. Szarapka, Janos	FKgP	1,667	7.92
6. Velkei, Arpad	IND	835	3.95

Bacs-Kiskun County, District 5 Kiskunfelegyhaza

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1. Fekete, Pal	MDF	6,506	38.51
2. Reczi, Dr. Laszlo	SZDSZ	5,067	30.00
3. Hollo, Dr. Denes		3,115	18.44
4. Garai, Dr. Isivan	MISC [7]	2,202	13.03

Bekes County District 5 Szarvas

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1. Deme, Zoltan	IND	14,669	53.55
2. Hunya, Lajos	FKgP	3,305	12.79
3. Fekete, Janos	IND	2,438	8.90
4. Kovacs, Peter	MULTI	2,255	8.23
5. Kolbusz, Dr. Judit	IND	1,428	5.21
6. Hanyecz, Vince M.	MNP	1,134	4.14
7. Szebegyinszki, Janos	IND	1,079	3.93

Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County, District 11 Szerencs

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1. Nemeth, Miklos	IND	17,458	59.96
2. Toth, Dr. Albert	MDF	2,674	9.18
3. Pelsoczi, Laszlo	FKgP	2,358	8.71
4. Vitanyi, Bela	SZDSZ	2,201	7.56
5. Puskas, Janos	KDNP	1,522	5.22
6. Biro, Istvan	MSZDP	872	2.99
7. Visoczki, Dr. Lajos	MISC [6]	668	2.29
8. Gyarmati, Zoltan	MISC [1]	640	2.19
9. Kertesz, Janos	MSZMP	539	1.85

Csongrad County, District 1 Szeged

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1. Raffay, Dr. Erno	MDF	16,631	53.42
2. Rozsnai, Dr. Balint	SZDSZ	3,774	12.12
3. Halasz, Anna, Mrs. Novak	MSZMP	2,281	7.82
4. Baba, Dr. Istvan	MISC [3]	1,209	3.89

Csongrad County, District 1 Szeged

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
5. Koppány, Dr. György	KDNP	1,206	3.87
6. Kalocsai, Miklós	FIDESZ	1,199	3.85
7. Gesztési, Dr. Ferenc	MSZMP	1,157	3.71
8. Siklós, András	FKgP	1,128	3.62
9. Székely, Dr. Zoltán	MSZDP	772	2.47
10. Talpai, János	MISC [6]	752	2.41
11. Abraham, Dr. László	HVK	553	1.77
12. Martonosi, Dr. István	MNP	468	1.50

Csongrad County, District 2 Szeged

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1. Király, Zoltán	MDF	25,261	65.47
2. Janko, Attila	SZDSZ	2,647	6.86
3. Veres, Csaba	FKgP	2,121	5.49
4. Szabo, Dr. Mihály	MSZP	1,647	4.26
5. Feher, Mihály	KDNP	1,532	3.97
6. Borbas, István	MISC [6]	1,441	3.73
7. Levay, Dr. Endre	MISC [3]	1,403	3.63
8. Krajko, Dr. Gyula	MSZMP	1,100	2.85
9. Toth, Dr. László	HVK	774	2.00
10. Kispeter, Dr. Szilveszter	MSZDP	657	1.70

Jasz-Nagykun-Szolnok County, District 6 Mezőtúr

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1. Toth, Dr. Albert	MDF	5,276	34.18
2. Arvai, Gyula	SZDSZ	3,987	25.83
3. Draskovits, Dénes	MSZP	3,384	21.92
4. Szunyogh, Dr. Valéria	FKgP	2,785	18.04

Pest County, District 16 Nagykoros

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1. Kulin, Dr. Sándor	MDF	5,377	32.80
2. Abraham, Dr. Tibor	SZDSZ	4,775	29.13
3. Lakos, Dr. László	MSZP	3,123	19.05
4. Huszar, Dr. Albert	FKgP	3,117	19.01

Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg County, District 4 Nagykálló

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1. Kallay, Kristóf	MULTI	7,856	46.52
2. Kun, Dr. Bertalan	FKgP	6,447	38.17
3. Gulyás, József	MISC [6]	898	5.81
4. Horváth, László	MISC [1]	630	3.73
5. Toth, János	MNP	586	3.47
6. Estók, Károly	IND	469	2.77

**Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg County, District 5
Baktaloranthaza**

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1. Jakab, Ferenc	MDF	6,961	45.67
2. Ivan, Dr. Erno	KDNP	3,605	23.65
3. Balint, Pal	FKgP	1,588	10.41
4. Lucza, Janos	MSZP	1,338	8.77
5. Pal, Elemer	MISC [6]	1,307	8.57
6. Nagylucskay, Laszlo	MISC [1]	441	2.89

Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg County, District 7 Kisvarda

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1. Mezey, Dr. Karoly	MDF	7,745	46.84
2. Kriveczky, Dr. Mrs. Bela	SZDSZ	3,206	19.39
3. Revesz, Balazs	FKgP	3,203	19.37
4. Szabo, Dr. Imre	MSZP	1,384	8.37
5. Kol, Tibor	MSZMP	788	4.76

**Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg County, District 8
Vasarosnameny**

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1. Szucs, Sandor M.	MDF	4,558	27.22
2. Ivanyi, Tamas	SZDSZ	4,478	26.74
3. Abrok, Imre	MISC [6]	2,240	13.37
4. Szabo, Gyula	FKgP	1,939	11.68
5. Kelemen, Dr. Miklos	MSZP	1,306	7.87
6. Toros, Barna	MISC [1]	1,282	7.65
7. Dobos, Bertalan	MISC [3]	734	4.38
8. Mate Toth, Arpad	HVK	194	1.15

Tolna County, District 4 Paks

Representative	Party	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes
1. Horvath, Lajos	MDF	4,845	38.84
2. Fazekas, Dr. Istvan	KDNP	3,020	24.21
3. Radochay, Dr. Imre	MSZP	2,332	18.69
4. Sarhegyi, Attila	SZDSZ	2,275	18.24

National Slate Candidates Receiving Mandates

90CH0057A Budapest *MAGYAR HIRLAP* in
Hungarian 10 Apr 90 p 5

[Article: "Representatives Receiving Mandates From the National Slates of Parties (the Number of Mandates Received Are in Parentheses)"]

[Text]

Hungarian Democratic Forum (10)

Szentagothai, Janos
Konya, Mrs. Imre Balsai
Istvan Salamon, Laszlo
Csoti, Gyorgy
Keri, Kalman
Zimanyi, Tibor
Varga, Janos
Zetenyi, Zsolt
Gyarmati, Dezso

Alliance of Free Democrats (23)

Beki, Gabriella
Soos, Karoly Attila
Raj, Tamas
Teller, Gyula
Havas, Gabor
Gado, Gyorgy
Meszaros, Istvan
Kadar, Ivan
Danis, Gyorgy
Freund, Tamas
Werner, Jozsef
Szigethy, Gyorgy
Derdak, Tibor
Getto, Jozsef
Zombori, Matyas
Horvath, Aladar
Rozsa, Edit
Vilagosi, Gabor
Buki, Dorottya
Haga, Antonia
Gulyas, Jozsef
Polyak, Sandor
Madai, Peter

Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Citizens Party (17)

Voros, Vince
Bejczy, Sandor
Kovats, Laszlo
Gebovits, Jenő
Dragon, Pal
Ivan, Dr. Geza
Kavasy, Dr. Sandor
Szabo, Lajos
Toth, Imre
Olah, Sandor
Bereczki, Vilmos Nagy
Varga, Dezso

Hajdu, Mrs. Istvan
Kapitany, Ferenc
Gyorivanyi, Dr. Sandor
Omolnar, Dr. Miklos
Lakatos, Mrs. Jozsef

Hungarian Socialist Party (18)

Szili, Sandor
Ormos, Dr. Maria
Annus, Jozsef
Vitanyi, Ivan
Demeny, Pal
Huszar, Dr. Tibor
Pal, Laszlo
Kovacs, Jenő
Nagy, Attila
Bekesi, Dr. Laszlo
Kovacs, Dr. Magda, Mrs. Kosa
Csehak, Dr. Judit
Kovacs, Laszlo
Jakab, Mrs. Robert
Gal, Dr. Zoltan
Lakos, Dr. Laszlo
Bossanyi, Katalin
Boros, Laszlo

Association of Young Democrats (12)

Orban, Viktor
Fodor, Gabor
Ader, Janos
Ungar, Klara
Trombitas, Zoltan
Nemeth, Zsolt
Varga, Mihaly
Rockenbauer, Zoltan
Glattfelder, Bela
Deutsch, Tamas
Tirts, Tamas
Molnar, Peter

Christian Democratic People's Party (10)

Fuzessy, Dr. Tibor
Ugrin, Emese
Karcsai, Sandor
Gaspar, Miklos
Lukacs, Miklos
Giczy, Gyorgy
Csepe, Bela
Rott, Nandor
Inotai, Ferenc
Balogh, Gabor

Threats Reportedly Received by Ministers

25000695E Budapest *NEPSZAVA* in Hungarian
31 Mar 90 p 16

[Interview with Lajos Nagy, chairman of the National Defense Office, by "S.A."; place and date not given: "Precautionary Measures—The Ministers Received Threats"]

[Text] [NEPSZAVA] Reports that members of the government have received threats and that they have come into a dangerous situation have spread. Is it true that protective services have had to be provided to the members of government?

[Nagy] The reports are true. According to information we have received, the members of the Council of Ministers have come into an endangered situation. This is not the first instance in Hungary, and this does not represent an extraordinary situation. In various countries of the world such cases occur virtually on a daily basis, at which time one must provide for the physical protection of certain high ranking personalities.

[NEPSZAVA] Which organization is at present providing protection to the members of the Hungarian Government?

[Nagy] Primarily the Government Guard under the auspices of the Interior Ministry. In such cases they take protective measures based on a plan that has been developed in advance.

[NEPSZAVA] What is the duration of personal protection?

[Nagy] Until we verify the truth of the reports, i.e. as long as a realistically dangerous situation exists.

[NEPSZAVA] Does the National Defense Office join in this activity?

[Nagy] Yes, in certain respects. Our primary job is to verify the information.

Privacy Protection, Freedom of Information Discussed

25000695B Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
2 Apr 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with professor Dr. Laszlo Solyom, by Szilvia Bartok; place and date not given: "Upcoming Societal Debate on the Law on Data Protection; There Should Be No More Secret Files"—first paragraph is NEPSZAVA introduction]

[Text] The legislative proposal concerning the handling of personal data and the release of public interest data will shortly be made the subject of societal debate. As a preliminary step in this matter the parties will hold a conference this morning at the Central Statistical Office [KSH] together with representatives of the most concerned ministries. We conversed with university professor Dr. Laszlo Solyom, the author of the legislative proposal.

[NEPSZAVA] What are the antecedents of this legislative proposal?

[Solyom] The legislative proposal was already complete in January 1988. This was very timely, because the equipping of Hungary with computers has been going on at a fast pace ever since the mid-1970's, without the

existence of a parallel law to secure the rights of citizens. Computerized data storage, in particular, presents a great threat to personal data and to the private sphere. In Hungary anyone will reveal his personal identification number without a second thought, without realizing that it is possible to abuse personal data. Therefore, it is necessary to establish legal guarantees simultaneously with the spread of computerization. The present legislative proposal is based on two important foundations. One is personal autonomy over information, i.e. the right of everyone to know who collects or maintains data about his person, where, and for what purpose such data is being used, quite naturally based on the advance concurrence of that person. The other basic idea is the freedom of information, which means that everyone must be able to have access to data that is of interest to the public. Accordingly, in response to an inquiry by anyone, state organs must present all data that is not secret, or which does not constitute the personal data of someone else. This, then, means that we should be able to look into the filing cabinets at ministries and the councils. We will be able to exercise control if we suspect that somewhere someone is gathering data about us.

[NEPSZAVA] What obstacle was there to presenting the law to Parliament, as long as it was completed in 1988?

[Solyom] The proposal has been circulating in various ministries for two years. It faced heavy resistance in one or another ministry, for example in the Ministry of the Interior. At the same time, the Opposition Roundtable was overly preoccupied in those days with daily political issues, such as the establishment of the television oversight committee, and had neither the time nor the energy left for the data protection law, even though discussion of this law was scheduled. In any event, at this time it would be beneficial for this proposal to become law as soon as possible. We will be able to become part of the international flow of information only if our data protection standards comply with standards established by the Strasbourg agreement of the Council of Europe. In plain words: We will receive data only if we provide legal protection for such data.

[NEPSZAVA] Does this proposal have some particularly sensitive elements?

[Solyom] Freedom of information has no traditions in Hungary, therefore many feel strange about this matter. In the Anglo-Saxon countries and in Scandinavia it has become natural by now for a citizen to enter an office and request that they show to him, let's say, the minutes prepared at last week's meeting of the atomic energy committee. They will show such documents to him in those countries, while in Hungary they would not even let him enter the office. One may expect resistance since a huge volume of thus far monopolized information would be rendered open. But under no circumstances would I want to provide ideas as to matters they should challenge.

[NEPSZAVA] How up to date is the legislative proposal you prepared two years ago?

[Solyom] The law may be regarded as modern, by all means, but the rapid development of data processing technology may outdate it. This, however, should not present a concern in Hungary for the time being. When in the future an overwhelming number of computerized networks will be working in Hungary, we will have to change the system that controls data protection, but even then, we will not have to change the basic principles.

One matter truly concerns me, however. This law will not be functional unless separate regulations are promulgated in several specialized fields. Building on the basic law, parallel to the basic law, we should develop supplemental regulations concerning financial matters, scientific research, sociological assessments, health care, and other matters. But as far as I know, no one is dealing with these matters at present.

SZDSZ Financial Statement Released

25000695C Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 31 Mar 90 p 7

[Text] Having been accused a number of times of accepting foreign moneys of unknown origin, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] was first among the parties to comply with the obligation specified in Paragraph 9 of the Law on Parties. It published its 1989 closing financial statement in MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 25, 90. The legal provision requires all Hungarian parties to publicize the previous year's financial statement in the official journal of the government by 31 March each year. Those parties that were among the first to do so include the Hungarian People's Party, which for weeks stubbornly demanded that parties be held financially accountable. Responding to an HVG question, Elemer Kiss, chairman of the Office of the Council of Ministers, said that as of 26 March only the SZDSZ submitted the document at issue to the editorial offices of MAGYAR KOZLONY. Parties which do not submit their financial statements to the editorial office by the middle of this week will be unable to comply with the requirements of the party law due to the time required for printing, according to the government official. The law also provides that the financial statement must include all revenues in excess of 500,000 forints received in the course of a year, as well as foreign contributions exceeding a 100,000 forint value. The law also provides that budgetary support provided to individual parties must not exceed the amount representing 50 percent of all the income of the given party.

Alliance of Free Democrats, 1989 Closing Financial Statement (amounts in forints)

A. Actual income

1. Membership dues: 1,540,640
2. State budgetary support
 - a. Basic amount: 7,000,000
 - b. Amount proportionate to votes received:—
2. Total: 7,000,000
3. Other contributions
 - a. From legal entities: 1,218,191

- i. Of this, amounts greater than 500,000 received from Hungarian entities:—
- ii. Of this, amounts greater than 100,000 received from foreign persons:—
- IDEE: 1,218,191
- Atlantic Research Publication, Incorporated: 624,187

b. From business organizations:—

c. From private persons: 651,347

- i. Of this, amounts greater than 500,000 received from Hungarian persons:—
- ii. Of this, amounts greater than 100,000 received from foreign persons:—

3. Total: 1,869,538

4. Party propaganda activities: 1,218,174

5. Party business activities:—

6. Other income

a. Loans: 5,000,000

b. Interest income: 16,610

7. Total 1989 income: 16,644,962

B. Actual expenses

1. Contributions made

- a. To the party's National Assembly delegation:—
- b. To party local organizations:—
- c. To institutions maintained or supported by the party:—
- d. To other social organizations: 3,000
- e. To foreign institutions and organizations:—

1. Total: 3,000

2. Personal services

- a. Wages: 807,784
- b. Expense reimbursements, per diem: 321,914
- c. Social security contribution: 127,534
- d. Social welfare, recreation support:—

2. Total: 1,257,232

3. General expenses

- a. Taxes and dues: 832,461
- b. Building operations, maintenance, public utilities: 40,829
- c. Rental of premises: 664,049
- d. Administration and postage: 685,840
- e. Miscellaneous: 961,113

3. Total: 3,184,292

4. Press and propaganda: 5,329,945

5. Elections-related expenses:—

6. Expenses related to other activities: 1,295,284

7. Total 1989 expense: 11,069,754

C. Actual financial situation as of 31 Dec 89

1. Income: 16,644,962
2. Expense: 11,069,754
3. Surplus: 5,575,298
4. Accumulated surplus from 1988: 28,000
5. Accumulated surplus as of 31 Dec 89: 5,603,208

Budapest, 9 March 1990

[Signed] Mrs. Laszlo Bene chief accountant
Tibor Vidas managing secretary

POLAND

Council of Europe Center To Aid Electoral Organization

90EP0447B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
24-25 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by R. W.: "Organization of Council of Europe Center Begins"]

[Text] (C.) The Documentation-Information Office of the Permanent Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe will open soon. Agreements reached on 5 February when Senator Jerzy Stepien and Docent Michal Kulesza, a Senate expert, visited the Council headquarters in Strasbourg indicate that the office will open within three months.

Specifically included among the tasks of this office will be maintaining continuous contact with the Council of Europe, providing prompt expert opinion pertaining to territorial self-government and disseminating self-government information. The center will also render ad hoc assistance in organizing elections and during the period immediately following elections. The Council of Europe will select and pay the experts engaged in this activity.

We have learned from the Office of the Council of Ministers that a representative of the Council of Europe has come to Poland to discuss organizational matters, particularly those pertaining to the location and equipment of the office. Immediate particulars, the date for opening the office, the location of the center, etc., will probably be announced as early as next week.

New Appointments to EC, Agriculture, Academy of Sciences

90EP0447C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
28 Feb 90 p 3

[Text] On the motion of the minister of Agriculture and Food Control, the president of the Council of Ministers recalled Wieslaw Mlynarczyk as secretary of state, expressing gratitude for his work in this position, and appointed Mieczyslaw Stelmach to the post of under secretary of state.

Mieczyslaw Stelmach was born in 1943 in Jasionka, Rzeszow Voivodship, into a peasant family. He graduated from the Higher Agricultural School in Wroclaw and has worked there since 1967. He passed the docent examination and is a technological sciences engineer. He is the author of more than 100 scientific publications. He has been a member of Rural Solidarity (NSZZ) since 1980, is married and has one son.

President Wojciech Jaruzelski appointed Jan Kulakowski to the position of representative-ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Poland to the European Community in Brussels.

Jan Kulakowski was born in 1930 in Myszkow. He participated in the resistance movement in Warsaw in 1944; in 1946 he left Poland to reside in Belgium. He was a labor and union activist in Belgium and in international federations. During 1976, 1977, 1981 and 1985, he was elected secretary general of the World Labor Confederation. During 1980-1981, he actively supported Solidarity in Poland.

The Council of Ministers confirmed the list of persons elected on 14 December, 1989, and 18 January, 1990, by the General Assembly of the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) to the Presidium of PAN for the 1990-1992 term.

Aleksander Gieysztor became president of PAN; vice presidents are Adam Bielanski, Wladyslaw Findeisen, Leszek Kuznicki, and Roman Ney. In addition, the presidium includes Jan Baszkiewicz, Mieczyslaw Chorazy, Roman Ciesielski, Witold Czachorski, Jerzy Haber, Janusz Haman, Mieczyslaw Klimowicz, Antonina Kloskowska, Wlodzimierz Kolos, Jerzy Kroh, Wlodzimierz Ostrowski, Andrzej Schinzel, Ryszard Sosnowski, Jan Steffen, Andrzej K. Tarkowski, Roman Teisseyre, Jerzy Topolski, Marian Truszczyński, Stefan Wegrzyn, and Kazimierz Zarzycki.

For the 1990-1992 term of office of Pan, the president of the Council of Ministers appointed the following section secretaries: Andrzej Wyczanski, Section I, Social Sciences; Romuald Klekowski, Section II, Biological Sciences; Jerzy Kolodziejczak, Section, Mathematical and Physical Sciences; Bohdan Ciszewski, Section IV, Technological Sciences; Saturnin Zawadzki, Section V, Agricultural and Forestry Sciences; Miroslaw Mossakowski, Section VI, Medical Sciences; and Jerzy Jankowski, Section VII, Geography and Mining Sciences. (PAP)

New Communist Party Founder on Goals, Membership

90EP0468A Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish
30 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Jan Zielinski, chairman, Union of Communists of the Polish Republic by sez; place and date not given: "A Red Rose Within an Outline of Poland, to the Left of SdRP"—first paragraph TRYBUNA introduction]

[Text] The Union of Communists of the Polish Republic (ZKRP), "Proletariat," has been organized in Katowice. The first issue of its informational bulletin, "Przedswit," has been published and contains a declaration of "21 points" and an outline of an interim constitution. This is an interview with the chairman of the organizing group, Dr. Jan Zielinski.

[TRYBUNA] Is this really the best time for organizing a communist party in Poland?

[Jan Zielinski] The aversion to communists does not discourage us, first of all, we are Poles. As patriots, we do not want a return to disparaging the activities of the

former Polish United Workers Party (PZPR). On the contrary, together with other parties and activist groups in Poland, we want more than anything to move toward the blossoming of the Polish Republic.

Like all honorable Poles, we turn with revulsion from totalitarian activities which resulted in political murders, incarceration and illegal elimination of dissidents. We want to prove that ideological communists loathe violence and dictatorship in any form.

[TRYBUNA] In taking a position on the left, you place yourselves to the left of SdRP. Is there any room to your left for others?

[Zielinski] Yes, since we decidedly distance ourselves from the extreme activities of fundamentalist groups, for example, those linked at one time with the so-called Katowice Forum which would favor a return to the old order.

Declaring our intention to join those forces of the Polish left that sprang from the former PZPR (SdRP and Unia [USdRP]), the Union of Communists of the Polish Republic will support both parties at least until it develops its own program and until it produces its own candidates for self-government or for parliamentary elections.

[TRYBUNA] What program goals does the ZKRP "Proletariat" set for itself?

[Zielinski] Certainly not the kind that we are suspected of setting. We are not preparing to take over the government. We are realists. We understand the great difficulties that surround us and the distrust of the people which will probably continue for a long time.

Despite this, we want to cooperate openly with those political circles that undertook the building of a qualitatively new Polish Republic, completely free, independent of the West and the East, sovereign in its laws, based on citizen self-government, ruled by people elected in democratic elections.

But as independence and sovereignty, we also understand economic independence, state control of foreign and domestic capital, state obligatory concern for those who will be able to offer their country only the work of their hands, their minds and talent.

[TRYBUNA] What kind of membership base can ZKRP count on now?

[Zielinski] There were 13 persons in the founding group, including 5 workers. On the other hand, there were no fundamentalists. From correspondence that we receive, I can say that there are approximately 115 persons who have chosen to be active in ZKRP. Most of us are mature people, but I find that surprisingly more and more often young people ask about us, seeking contacts, access to our documents, etc.

By three's or by five's, ZKRP "Proletariat" circles are active in Katowice, Raciborz, Ruda Slaskowa, Sosnowiec, and Zabrze.

I will not hide the fact that among those declaring an intention to join us, many fear formal participation in the party in view of possible harassment and trouble at work or where they live.

[TRYBUNA] How can you be recognized?

[Zielinski] At demonstrations, we will carry red banners with red and white bows. We also have our emblem: a red rose sketched within an outline of Poland. Our song is Swiecicki's "Warszawianka." Our holiday, the first of May.

[TRYBUNA] How can one contact the founding group of ZKRP?

[Zielinski] Our colleagues from SdRP did not agree to having their temporary headquarters serve as a delivery point for correspondence directed to us. Since we do not have any property, you may address correspondence to: Jan Zielinski, Sosnowiec, Nr. kodu 41-200, Poste restante.

[TRYBUNA] Thank you.

Center-Right Parties Meet To Discuss Cooperation

90EP0435A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 10, 10 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Marek Henzler: "The Right Leg"]

[Text] At the beginning of this year, Lech Walesa expressed the idea that if a normal political system is to be formed in Poland, two strong legs will be needed—a left leg, or actually a center-left, and a right, or more strictly, a center-right leg. But although 2 months have already elapsed, the new political system is based more on "Solidarity's" citizens committees than on clearly defined, by program and organization, political parties.

The fact that the right leg is now less weak than the left, could have been observed during the "Center-Right in Poland" conference arranged by the Poznan Foundation for the Support of Independent Political and Economic Thought "For Poland and Ourselves", established by the Movement for Polish Politics (RPP). The RPP, which announced its formation in November of last year, is not a political party. It is made up of a group of activists of citizens committees, economic societies, political clubs, and deputies from the Parliamentary Citizens Club (OKP), who want to "crystallize positions" and attract various groups of a center-right character, and negate socialism and communism. The RPP activists are to mutually combine nonexcluding elements of liberal, conservative, Christian and national thought.

Kisiel's Directive

Among those invited to the roundtable of the Polish right were representatives of the Democratic Party (SD) (but from the "Democracy '90 group), the Liberal-Democratic Congress, the Liberal-Democratic "Independence" Party, the Labor Party, the Conservatives Clubs from Lodz and Wroclaw, the Union for Real Politics, and the Christian National Union. Also some Catholic Intellectuals Clubs, Catholic associations, activists in economic societies and citizens committees, and a large group of deputies and senators from OKP. Insignias with the cross of St. Andrew, with the "Intrepid" sword, and something new—a crowned eagle "standing" on the "Solidarity" name, appeared on coat lapels.

From abroad came: English Conservatives (they suggested that the state sell houses to citizens, as does Prime Minister Thatcher), a West Berlin Christian Democrat, a young Gaullist, and some not politically defined—but tending toward socialism—guests from Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately, the promised Nestors of the Polish center-right did not arrive: Stanislaw Stomma and Stefan Kisielewski. Kisielewski pleaded illness. "I really do not know"—he wrote in a letter to "Dear friends on the right"—"how the right differs from the center-right. I hope that both remain a safe distance from socialism." The organizers and participants of the conference, of whom there were a total of 150 (which sometimes gave the impression that this was more a meeting of organizers than participants), tried to comply with this directive.

Today the center and the right continue to be split and divided, and perhaps even more than the present left. Hence, so that "family" quarrels should not dominate the deliberations, the organizers did not invite representatives from the traditional centrist parties (only Jacek Szymanderski, from PSL (Polish Peasant Party) "Solidarity", showed up) or representatives situated on the very right (nevertheless Zbigniew Jaciniacki from one of the parties came.) Despite this organizational measure, controversies arose during the discussions which did not stem from any basic program differences of the individual groups, but rather from the political ambitions of their leaders and the strivings of the rather vaguely self-defined political circles.

Second, it turned out that neither the center nor the right are able to define themselves in an unequivocal way. All of them emphasized that this is not the time to cite historical definitions and most defined their programs by indicating what they do not want to be, and did not define what they want to be. In any case, this is not a sore point of only the Polish center-right camp—the same can be seen in the left camp.

Fruit of Creative Tension

Deputy Michał Chalonski, president of the Staropolski [Old Polish] Economic Society presented an attempt to synthesize the program of the center-right camp. In his opinion, the continuity of the history and traditions of

political activity was severed in communist Poland, but although now the old parties are being recreated: National, Christian Democratic, PPS (Polish Socialist Party), and PSL, such a linear continuation is an anachronism because it does not sufficiently take into account the conditions which exist in Poland and the world today. Discussions as to who was right: Pilsudski or Dmowski, Korfanty or Witos, are of no value today and inspiration should be sought in the contemporary ideas of the democratic West, which are the "fruit of the creative tension between conservative and liberal thought."

The basis for center-right ideas is supposed to be religion, Christian, of course, which provides a certain foundation to a system of values. This has nothing to do with political clericalism, and "the ostentatious use of Catholicism in public activity, especially in our Polish circumstances, we believe to be inadvisable, while we believe that to implicate the authority of the church in the political game is simply damaging," said Chalonski.

The second source which should be drawn upon is liberal thought, particularly its ethos of freedom: freedom of religion, speech, conscience, assembly, and also economic freedom "together with the inviolable right to private ownership and an unfettered free market economy."

The third source of inspiration is conservatism, meaning, above all, "a certain type of sensitivity and schooling, and a style of political thinking." This is also "respect for the natural hierarchy of authority," as well as "faith in the superiority of freedom over equality, excepting equality under the law." Conservatism in politics is "the tendency to seek fair compromises and apply evolutionary methods. (...) Without absolutizing the concept of a nation, we believe it nevertheless to be an extremely important bond."

"We would most like to call ourselves 'Christian-Liberal Conservatives,'" Chalonski summed up.

The Right With a Human Face

Minister Aleksander Hall, responsible for political relations with the parties, participated in the conference. According to Hall, Poland needs a modern, open-to-the-world, right, and without such a formation it is difficult to imagine any further building of a democratic state. It is supposed to guard freedom and property, voice the need for a strong state and defend the national interest, without turning the nation and the Polish state into a fortress threatened from the outside and under siege. It is high time that the stereotypical notions about the Polish right, implanted by leftist propaganda, be done away with. Knowing Hall's early political history, it would be difficult to imagine another view of the present minister on the role of the right in Poland.

The right with a human face was sought in three working groups. In each of them controversies came to the fore

which undermined the coherence of the synthesis presented by Deputy Chalonski. Almost everyone accepted Christian values, but differences appeared on the institutional connection with the Church, and there were also differences in relation to the understanding of democracy and authority.

A lively discussion ensued in the economic group which concluded with a speech by Senator Andrzej Machalski, in which he stated that as a nation we are not prepared to take the economy into our own hands. The government was criticized for talking a lot about privatization instead of carrying it out. Private entrepreneurs, it was said, should organize and push the extremely leftist government more to the right!

The sharpest conflicts occurred in the political group. The thesis was suggested that the Polish society intuitively leans to the right today. In any case, this was indicated by the recent statistical study which shows that in Europe, aside from England, capitalism really has the most advocates in Poland! The falsified picture of the Polish right must be turned around by gaining greater access to the mass media and forming the appropriate research institutes.

Two ways of converting society into leftist political action were presented. One, the so-called "negative" way is by forming an Anti-Socialist Front, promoted by Janusz Korwin-Mikke from the Union for Real Politics (UPR), and the other, "positive" way, by outlining the goals and striving to achieve them. Here we should say more about the role which the UPR leader played at the conference.

Already on the first day of deliberations, Korwin-Mikke accused the organizers, i.e., the UPR, that they arranged the conference in order to show the West that in Poland there is also a right, and the West should invest its dollars in its further development. Hence such a large representation of foreign guests...

Then the head of UPR, supported by representatives of the "Freedom" Liberal-Democratic Party, began to look for enemies of the right. They were not looked for in the Social-Democratic parties which arose after the former PZPR. Basically, nothing at all was said about them... The leftist enemy was sought in the enfranchised left nomenklatura, now passing as the center and right, in "Solidarity", in the Citizens Committees, and most of all in the alliance of the lay left with the Christian Democratic left, which dominated the presidium of the OKP...and now would like to also create a "Solidarity" "licensed" right...

Those opposing this view accused them of mythologizing the influence of the left in the OKP. But then the deputies and senators from the OKP were heard from, and one after another they began to talk about how they are being steered by the social-democratic minority of the OKP, and how the voices of the "Solidarity" center and right are being silenced in GAZETA WYBORCZA, which is subservient to the presidium of the OKP, and in

television. One of the deputies even appealed to the right to establish its own GAZETA WYBORCZA. The conflict within the OKP is growing and the last secret meeting of the club outside of Warsaw was supposed to clarify the situation, but this has not yet come about. Nevertheless, the right and the center of OKP will no longer allow themselves to be dictated by the OKP left—so said the deputies—and in a short time we should expect changes in the OKP presidium. There was also talk during the secret meetings about speeding up the elections for parliament, that they should be held in the spring of 1991.

The leaks from the OKP meeting acted upon Korwin-Mikke like a red cape on a bull. He called for the convening of an antisocialist congress in Warsaw. "Let us not to be afraid of the word 'antisocialism,'" the UPR leader said. "Let us show, especially in Congress Hall, how strong the real right in Poland is." On the second day of the deliberations, a group of organizers of the future congress met. It was decided that the next organizing meeting would be held on 24 March in Warsaw and that the congress would be held in May. In addition to the friends and members of UPR, the meeting was attended by members of the Movement to Unify Europe, the Conservatists Club, the Organizational Committee of the Conservative Party, the Christian National Union, the National Party, and other individuals, not politically identified.

Come Hear the Old Melodies

The prolonged search for the leftist enemy finally led to the failure of the participants of the conference to pass a uniform concluding declaration. The right's "round-table", although all center and right groups did not take part in it and some of those who were present retained the status of observers, more clearly revealed the state of the Polish center-right, very differentiated organizationally and politically. Some groups are made up of a few people, others number a few thousand. They often think in pre-World War II terms, but are also looking for ties to what the right in Western Europe is now creating. Some would like to remain in their national-clerical seclusion, others would like to open themselves up widely—intellectually and economically—to a unified Europe. But it is apparent that they do not wish to go along with those who call for a rightist totalitarianism or an outright physical contest with the left.

The center-right is divided by many things: their relationship to the government and its foreign policy, the matter of privatization and the selling of assets to foreign capital, views on the role of religion and the Church, even a look at the place from which the center and the right begin (one definition given is that the center begins to the right of the left!). Their opinion as to whether Poland is already independent or not, also differs.

What, primarily, unites them: their negative relationship to the left, in some measure similar to the "combatant" past, the sometimes shrill amplification of political

announcements, and lack of discernment of their real influence with potential electors, which cannot be accurately determined without voting. The number of their members, as a rule, is a closely guarded secret.

Can their programs today attract the electorate? It is hard to predict. Decades of "socializing" society has had its effect but, on the other hand, scores of mistakes by the hitherto ruling leftist camp are also visible to the naked eye. The participants of the "right" conference ate their dinners in the "Adria" restaurant. At its entrance hung a large cloth banner with the words "Come Hear the Old Melodies."

National Judiciary Council Holds Inaugural Session

90EP0447A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
24-25 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by FR: "National Judiciary Council Begins Action: Great Powers"]

[Text] (C.) The National Judiciary Council held its first inaugural meeting in Warsaw on 23 February. To the

office of president, the 24 members of the Council elected Dr. Stanislaw Zimoch, a judge of the Voivodship Court in Lodz (opposing candidates were Deputy Jozef Lubieniecki and Professor Dr. Adam Lopatka, the first president of the Supreme Court). Jan Wasilewski, Supreme Court judge, was elected vice president.

"The broad range of powers of the National Judiciary Council can be described in one statement: It must always have as its goal the good of the administration of justice," said Stanislaw Zimoch, speaking to journalists. "In the immediate future, we will present a specific program. Today, however, we can foresee that it will include selecting judges for the Supreme Court, appointing associate judges to positions as judges in regional courts and appointing judges of the regional courts to positions as judges of voivodship courts. We will also establish court regulations and schedules."

Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Polish president, received the members of the National Judiciary Council in Belvedere Palace.

HUNGARY

Defense Minister on Romanian Charges of Troop Concentrations

25000695A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
22 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Defense Minister Ferenc Karpati, by Peter Vajda in Budapest on 21 March: "Karpati: Fabricated News About Hungarian Troop Concentrations Serve Chauvinist Interests"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] During the past day and a half defense minister Ferenc Karpati talked on the phone twice with representatives of the Romanian military leadership. He voiced the need for the Romanian Army act to secure the rights of the persecuted Hungarian nationality in Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures] and in Transylvania. Peter Vajda discussed this issue with him on Wednesday afternoon at his office.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Mr. Minister, what conversations did you have during the past two days with Romanian military leaders concerning the Marosvasarhely events?

[Karpati] I will begin my answer by saying that late at night on 19 March Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth called my home to inform me about the Marosvasarhely events and the fate of Andras Suto. He called on me to obtain information from the Romanian military leadership, to find out what they were doing to stop the bloody disturbances, and to request their assistance in transporting Andras Suto to Hungary. I immediately tried to get in touch with Romanian military leaders. They were out of touch for hours; I was unable to talk to the minister, but I reached the chief of staff on the morning of the 20th. I expressed shock over the events, reminded him of the recent upper-level meeting, and told him that in the given situation the Romanian Army should take the firmest possible actions to harness the anti-Hungarian disturbances. I also complained about the fact that we were unable to get in touch with them earlier, for which we cannot be faulted.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What was the colonel general's reply?

[Karpati] He told me that, based on available photographs, they will find the culprits and present them to trial. He referred to these people as hooligans and promised to take stringent steps so that all of this would not be repeated. At my request the chief of staff agreed to have Andras Suto brought to Hungary.

[NEPSZABADSAG] At what time did you succeed in reaching the defense minister?

[Karpati] Defense Minister Stanculescu called me this morning to express his sincere regret over the events. He stated that forces that are opposed to the December revolution are acting to spoil the relationship between

the Romanians and the Hungarian and other nationalities that have coexisted for centuries. He said that a government commission has left Bucharest to investigate the events. He informed me that substantial military forces have been concentrated in Marosvasarhely and that they control the more significant buildings.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What did you say in the course of your conversation?

[Karpati] I made reference to the fact that in the present situation it would be very important to have the real culprits of the brutal anti-Hungarian atrocities stand trial within the shortest possible time. In response he said that nowadays there are many rumors, and in this relation he raised a question....

[NEPSZABADSAG] What was the question?

[Karpati] He asked me whether it was true that the Hungarian Army was moved from the western part of Hungary to the east. I replied by saying that quite naturally, we did not take such steps.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What could be the source of such Romanian reports, and what purpose could reports about Hungarian Army concentrations serve?

[Karpati] By all means, such rumors are suitable for the strengthening of chauvinism and the incitement of hysterical anti-Hungarian sentiments. I also told the minister that it was extremely unfortunate that at times when such grave events are taking place near our borders, the Hungarian defense minister is unable to get in touch with the appropriate Romanian leaders.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Mr. Minister, how do you view reports which hold that Romanian military officers also took part in the brutal anti-Hungarian acts, and in your view, to what extent should we trust the word of military leaders in Bucharest?

[Karpati] We had earlier reports which indicated that, just as in local leadership, the officers' core includes persons whose actions are dictated by extremist chauvinism. As far as the second part of your question is concerned, in my conversation with the minister I repeatedly voiced the fact that under any circumstances the role and responsibility of the army are significant in Romania; that I felt that firm measures were required to secure human rights in defense of the threatened Hungarians; and that, naturally, judgment will be made only on the basis of facts.

[NEPSZABADSAG] One final question. Andras Suto is being treated in a hospital under your ministry's jurisdiction. What do you know about his condition?

[Karpati] All I can say is that we have selected our best physicians. And that I, personally have given instructions that I be informed regularly, several times a day, about the condition of Andras Suto, whose recovery we all hope for.

INTRABLOC

CEMA Market More Attractive for Western Capital Goods

90GE0031A East Berlin AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT
in German 7 Mar 90 pp 25-28

[Unattributed Article: "Western Producers Market Capital Goods in New Ways"]

[Text] Over the past 10 years, Western entrepreneurs have become increasingly more interested in expanding their cooperation with CEMA countries. Their efforts to develop mutual trade and business relations have encountered serious obstacles (results of changes in the economy of CEMA countries, a substantial drop over the past few years in world-market prices for energy-related commodities, export restrictions imposed by the West on high-tech products to CEMA-countries, and so on). Present trade relations between industrial countries of the West and the CEMA countries are still dominated by traditional export-import deals. Partnerships, licensing agreements, as well as joint ventures are on the way up, but so far they have earned relatively little.

However, changed market conditions in CEMA countries (such as the granting of export licenses—a mechanism that increasingly causes manufacturers to bring production in line with their company's financial strength) encourage Western enterprises to participate in newly developed forms of cooperation.

Changes in Marketing Strategies

Despite some long-standing problems, CEMA countries have become of great interest to Western businesses. Increased opportunities to expand reciprocal trade have led Western producers to favor the following export strategies:

- Activities to gain access to new markets to compensate for marketing difficulties experienced in established and domestic markets.
- An increased interest in long-term, stable relations with CEMA countries because such a framework favors long-term trade agreements.
- A reluctance by Western enterprise to choose new ways in industrial and technological cooperation, especially when direct investment of capital is involved. Insufficient information about actual market realizations and the risk that presently favorable conditions could change and become disadvantageous are important reasons for this reluctance.
- An interest in new ways of cooperation, such as joint ventures, when they seem best suited to secure market positions and profits.
- In principle, CEMA countries pay for Western imports with ever increasing exports of finished goods. It is thus very important for Western businesses who

want to deal with CEMA countries to consider accepting barter agreements. Even though Western businesses respond in different ways to barter agreements, they actively advertise their readiness to enter a barter deal and they will accept it as long as it promises competitive advantages and new markets. Banks handle other important aspects of such deals including financial advice on how to innovatively finance such ventures. The Japanese, as a rule, turn the arrangement of barter deals over to their international trading companies. Other capitalist businesses tend to engage specialized trading companies who are in the business of brokering such deals. Big corporations in the FRG have created their own subsidiaries to handle barter deals.

These Firms Generally Offer the Following Services:

- Preparation of market studies and financing suggestions;
- Insurance against risks not covered by government export incentives;
- Conclusion of business deals (including all commercial negotiations and credit arrangements);
- Sale of bartered goods, and
- Establishment of offices or trade representations in the partnership country.

Cooperation Agreements on the Increase

Businesses in the West are increasingly interested in industrial cooperation with CEMA countries. Cooperative agreements finalized to modernize certain large projects in the industrial sector of CEMA countries (for example the enlargement of an aluminium processing plant in the Soviet Republic of Armenia by the French firm Pechiney S.A. in conjunction with Soviet partners, or the cooperation between the U.S. firm Guardian Industries and the Hungarian glass factory Oroshaza to manufacture plate glass) are of special importance among long-term cooperation projects.

Most important for the successful conclusion of such agreements is the willingness of Western businesses to grant licenses and to share their know-how, to make intensive training available for labor and management and to help procure production materials during the first phase of cooperation. Even though such well-established sectors of cooperation as machine engineering, electro-technical/electronic industries and light industries will stay in first place, Western big business is increasingly interested in putting together other substantial projects (such as tapping the huge raw material reserves of the USSR).

The gradual increase in cooperative interactions (such as the production and replacement of parts, the production of assembly sets or finished sets to round out a selection or to complement an entire line of products; joint product research and development) is to be an essential

prerequisite for the long-term development of more intensive forms of cooperation, such as joint ventures.

Cooperation between industries has its basis in the granting of licenses; it often includes technical support in the production and marketing of products.

When Western enterprises give out licenses to CEMA countries, they want to improve both their production and to firm up their market position in CEMA countries. Licensing agreements are oftentimes tied to an agreement to supply production equipment and to deliver assembly sets and parts over an extended period of time. In the most recent past, well-known Western enterprises have given more and more licenses to businesses in CEMA countries—mostly in conjunction with the formation of joint ventures—to start production. Salamander AG of the FRG took on the delivery of machines and equipment for two joint ventures in the USSR and issued corresponding production licenses. Part of the licensing is usually an agreement to train the technical staff, to assist in production, product inspection and control, and in furnishing prototypes.

Capitalist enterprises had not shown much interest in forming joint ventures with CEMA countries until the last two or three years, but conditions have greatly improved during this time. By the end of 1987, capitalist enterprises were part of 200 joint ventures in CEMA countries; 140 in Hungary, 10 in Bulgaria, eight in Romania, 19 in Poland, nine in the CSSR, and 19 in the USSR. Once the Soviets and the Hungarians went about simplifying and enhancing the legislation that governs the formation of joint ventures with Western firms, new joint ventures cropped up everywhere. (Simplifications and enhancements brought the following improvements: Western firms can now own controlling interests, joint ventures are no longer required to sell for convertible currency only, taxes on capital gains only come due in the third year of profit yield, products can be sold on the domestic market for national currency, foreign managers are allowed into the country. The improved business climate is also due to the formation of the "Union of USSR Based Joint Ventures" and to the "Club of Foreign Joint Ventures in Hungary," sponsored by the Hungarian Board of Trade.) In mid-1989, the USSR had over 600 registered joint ventures with foreign investors—about one-fourth were active. The nominal capital of these ventures amounts to about 2 billion rubles.

Joint ventures in the production and service sector are currently favored by Western firms; 50 percent of all joint ventures in the USSR and in Hungary are in the production sector. This includes numerous joint ventures in light industry and in brand-name consumer goods production (the West-German Salamander AG has set up two joint ventures in the USSR producing shoes; Adidas has one joint venture in Hungary.) Joint ventures have the objective of utilizing progressive technology and management techniques and helping to supply consumers with goods. These firms characteristically specialize in the production of one or two products.

Capitalist firms generally participate at low levels in joint ventures—well below the possible 49 percent. Total investment in CEMA countries by Western firms is about \$400-500 billion. Western investment in Hungary runs on the average to about \$500,000 per joint venture, and in the USSR to little more than \$1 million. In general, Western corporations have participated on a rather moderate level in joint ventures with CEMA countries. Some sectors, though, such as raw material exploration, will increasingly attract the attention of Western firms.

Increasing Engineering and Consulting Services

Western firms take a growing interest in planning, projecting and executing industrial projects in CEMA countries by extending engineering, consulting, and managerial services. Such services make it easy to influence decisions concerning contract awards and contract conditions. Services as a rule are rendered via cooperative agreements between Western entrepreneurs and their relevant partners (for example the cooperation agreement between the U.S. firm Bechtel and the Hungarian enterprise Transelektro, where the U.S. firm renders engineering services to build power stations in Hungary). Often, consulting firms become active partners in joint ventures, for example:

- The joint venture Dresser/Soviet Engineering—This venture consists of two research and production units of the Soviet Ministry for Chemical and Petroleum Engineering, the export companies Stankoimport and Sojushim export (for a total of 60 percent), and the American firm Dresser Industries.
- Consofin—This Soviet/Finnish engineering and consulting firm consists of the Finnish company Jaako Perjuu and the Soviet forecasting institute Giprobum, Leningrad. The venture plans to modernise the Soviet chemical pulp industry. In general, joint ventures of this nature initiate business deals in CEMA countries, render consulting services, handle mechanical assembly work related to modernization projects, conduct feasibility studies on new projects, and look out for additional joint venture prospects—especially in the production sector.

For the realization of complex ventures such as the tapping of a region's raw materials or the creation of large industrial conglomerates in the power generation industry, the chemical, chemical pulp, and paper production industry, capitalist enterprises are setting up international consortiums.

For CEMA countries this is a relatively new format, and it comprises the following aspects:

- Export of machines, equipment, and their supervised installation;
- A "tailored to needs" financing package;
- Purchase of most goods produced, and

—Technical and managerial project administration until the repayment of long-term credits. Consortia retain banks which provide the financial means for such long-term projects.

Increasingly, financial institutions are offering financial services. Banks have become an important factor in the competition for CEMA markets because they have a tendency to support their respective nations in the search for business and cooperation agreements with CEMA countries. Well-known banks such as the Deutsche Bank (FRG), Credit Lyonnais (France), and the Viennese Creditanstalt Bankverein (Austria) are well enough established to prepare joint ventures and to execute lesser business deals such as those that five West German financial institutions have concluded with the Soviet export bank.

One long-term financing mechanism between Western firms and CEMA countries is leasing. Leasing is only in its beginning stages; it requires the participation of Western leasing firms or banks that guarantee long-term financing to suppliers. For example, the Finnish firm Kalmar LMV contracted with a Swiss leasing firm to pull off a deal with the Soviet shipping company Sovcomflot for the delivery of over 90 forklift trucks (worth DM17.5 million). The Swiss firm concluded a seven year leasing deal with the Soviets and paid the Finns immediately.

With regard to CEMA countries, increased competition by West European investors for these markets as well as internationally more competitive pay schedules for complex supply situations will significantly increase the importance of leasing companies.

New Export Activities

New ways in technology export between capitalist and CEMA countries, such as the practice of combining the sale of licenses with the leasing of technological equipment, or the ever-growing number of engineering and consulting services that conceive and assign projects, assess them from economic and technical points of view, and transfer Western know-how by supplying entire installations, show how closely linked some export activities are to the transfer of technology, and how increasingly important it has become to combine the export of services with the export of machinery, equipment, and installations.

The increase in export licenses to CEMA countries has led Western firms to offer specific services such as the marketing of CEMA products in Western markets. Besides the sale of products from joint ventures, such services cover advertising, public relations, as well as instruction and training on how to sell products from socialist countries effectively. Here are some examples:

—The Soviet advertising firm Vneshtorgreklama and the British marketing and consulting firm Craton, Lodge and Knight International, together with Francis Killibrook Bain International have concluded a cooperation agreement to advise Soviet export firms in

product development, advertising, and marketing. In addition, the Soviet firm is interested in handling the advertisement for British companies who want to advertise in the Soviet Union.

—U.S. management training institutes are ready to train economic cadres in the Soviet Union and in Hungary. A joint Hungarian-American-Italian firm was formed just recently for this purpose. Participants among others are the Hungarian Creditbank and the consulting firm Szenzor, Indiana University, and the recently established East-West Management Institute, and the Bank Sao Paolo in Turin.

—Similar arrangements have been set up between Hungary and the FRG for the training of Hungarian managers in the FRG.

—The FRG and the Soviet Union agreed on establishing a center for management and marketing in Leningrad. In addition, the management/consulting firm Roland Berger and Company, GmbH, Munich agreed to train the management cadre of Leningrad's metal industry. The formation of a joint venture consulting firm is a future option.

Most of the activities Western enterprises conduct in CEMA countries are supported and accompanied by several measures sponsored by formal and informal government agencies, by industrial associations, and institutions for the advancement of business and finance. They aim to enhance the competitiveness of firms active on CEMA markets. Some approaches include:

—The signing of long-term international agreements concerning reciprocal trade and science-technology oriented cooperation as the basis for the development of reciprocal trade in general.

—The signing of investment protection and investment incentive agreements as well as of credit agreements to support specific investment aspects.

—The taking advantage of government-level negotiations in setting up and conducting trade discussions and negotiations.

—The creation of information and contact centers at chambers of industry and commerce, and at other trade related associations to support consulting and information services and to guarantee the availability of service and maintenance.

These measures are designed to make it possible for smaller and medium-size CEMA enterprises to participate in trade projects as well.

Special importance for the development of reciprocal trade relations is attributed to the activities of bilateral chambers of commerce and joint economic councils. When the British-Soviet chamber of commerce supported trade between the USSR and Britain, sales surged by one-fourth within one year.

Marketing and Management Cooperation Between CEMA Countries and Western Industrial Countries

Areas of Cooperation/Purpose	Partners
Public Relations/Advertising	
—Public relations agency Aces Budapest Public Relations, Limited. East-West economic relations, market-wide	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hungarian media (15%) • Bank of Budapest (13%) • Aces Holding GmbH, Vienna (50%) • Pallas Publishing company, Vienna (22%)
—Axel Springer Budapest GmbH (Publishing). Magazine design and editing for the Hungarian market. Cooperation with Hungarian printing presses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Credit Bank of Hungary (50%) • Axel Springer Publishing Berlin (West) (50%) • Ferenczy AG, Zurich
—Product development, advertising, and marketing consulting for Soviet companies. Advertisements in the USSR for British products	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vneshtorgreklama/USSR • Craton, Lodge and Knight International/UK • Francis Killingbrock Bain International/UK
—Advertising for Western Industries in the Soviet newspaper Izvestija	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Izvestija, Moscow • Aenne Burda GmbH/FRG • Burda GmbH/FRG
—U.S./Hungarian advertising agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interpress/Hungary • McCann-Ericson/United States
Managerial Training	
—Formation of a U.S.-Hungarian-Italian company to train Hungarian students (later to include students from member and CEMA countries) trained by West European and U.S. scholars. As well as through cooperation with the Business School of the University of Indiana and management centers in London and Oxford	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Credit Bank of Hungary (60%) • Hungarian Chamber of Commerce (7%) • Consulting Firm Szenzor (11%) • U.S. Soros Foundation • Chamber of Commerce, Milan • Banco Sao Paolo, Turin
—Establishment of a center for management and marketing in Leningrad. Training courses for Soviet cadres	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FRG • USSR
—Business/administrative consulting of Soviet cadres	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Metal factory Leningrad • Roland Berger and Partners Consulting Firm/FRG

Official information and contact centers that had been set up both in several Western industrial countries and selected CEMA countries have been very helpful in the past. For example:

- The FRG/Bulgarian Center for Technical Cooperation and Contacts in Sofia;
- The Center for the Advancement of Trade of the West German Embassy in Bulgaria;
- The Association for FRG/USSR Business Relations in Leningrad, and

—A task force of the chamber of industries and commerce of Baden-Wuerttemberg in Stuttgart to advance trade with the USSR.

Western industrial countries see the purpose of arrangements of this and similar types in that they assist companies in choosing possible partners, that they broker contacts between suitable firms, that they assist in the organization of exhibitions in CEMA countries (especially for products in machine engineering), that they give advice in administrative, financial, currency, and contractual questions, and that they assist in the training of skilled labor.

Specific Marketing Activities

Western countries in general open up and cultivate markets in CEMA countries through methods that assure direct customer contact and information influx. Activities that are directly customer and consumer related are most prominent among market activities. Western companies responded to changes in CEMA market conditions with the following marketing strategies:

—The abrupt increase in the number of potential customers has complicated the initiation, preparation, and realization of business deals considerably. To solve the problem, Western companies are responding with market targeting practices and advertising campaigns to open up markets and win over consumers. By using brochures, media advertising, and targeted invitations for sales-promotion and information-related events, they get a chance to talk directly to the decisionmakers in industry and can thus actively influence their decisions on what to buy.

—Also of great importance is the regular participation in trade fairs and exhibitions, as well as the arrangement of trade fairs in CEMA countries by Western companies and the conducting of symposia to establish and cultivate stable customer relations. The number of Western firms who have made use of such methods has increased significantly. The Italian industrial fair "Italiana 2000" held in Moscow in October 1988, brought far-reaching marketing options to the 264 Italian firms which attended.

For the first time, Austrian shoe apparel producers organized an exhibiton in Moscow. They demonstrated the state of the art in Austria's shoe apparel industry and indicated ways and means for increased cooperation.

Participation in trade fairs (such as the Polygrafbum-mash/USSR or the international machine engineering fair for light industry Inlegmash/USSR) stresses the tendency of capitalist advertisers to remain flexible about what products to push at the right time. The concentration on rotary offset and packaging presses as well as on equipment needed by the textile and shoe industries came as a result of an increased demand by the USSR for such goods.

Western producers actively use fairs and exhibitions as marketing tools. The idea of using fairs to win over new customers in CEMA countries includes well-focused preparations (the careful selection of business partners, considerations of how to lay out and appoint exhibition booths), personal appearances during the fair (to explain about products, to discuss problem-solving with users and potential customers, to demonstrate innovations before the general public), and the cultivation of contacts at the end of the fair. Videos and simulations are used to demonstrate applications that are of interest to specific markets and users. Such methods are particularly popular with complicated product lines or wide service offerings such as in the tool manufacturing industry. Western firms are exploring new ways of advertising.

They increasingly make use of newspapers and trade publications to satisfy increased user demand for information by reporting on delivery, performance, and user data. In November 1988, the Soviet newspaper *Izvestija* and the West German publishing companies Burda GmbH and Aenne Burda GmbH, Offenburg, concluded an agreement for that purpose. As a result, Western firms can advertise weekly in *Izvestija* about investment opportunities, new technological processes, and services. Burda has an exclusive contract on these advertisements.

Another agreement between the Italian multicorporate media enterprise Berlusconi and the State Committee for Soviet Television and Broadcasting made it possible to flash advertisements on Soviet television. West German firms can buy air time by contacting the Publitel GmbH, Munich—a subsidiary of Berlusconi. Berlusconi is also the general agent for Europe.

Western companies follow a gradual procedure in building out their marketing organization in CEMA countries. In most cases they still prefer to conduct business via subsidiaries, investment firms or branch offices located in Austria, West Berlin or the FRG. For example, the Austrian automotive factory Graef & Stift in Vienna (a holding company of MAN) supplies a number of CEMA countries with MAN heavy trucks, and the FRG firm Montanwerke Walter GmbH, Tuebingen, founded a subsidiary in Vienna responsible for priming CEMA markets. Western companies have to some extent maintained liaison offices in CEMA countries for quite some time. But in recent years, the trend has turned to opening regular offices whose main purpose is to cultivate contacts, to supply information, and to conduct market studies. Some offices have handled actual business deals. At present, about 30 Italian firms have permanent offices in the USSR.

The FRG based firm Varioline GmbH, Sehnde/Hanover, since 1978 active as an industrial parts replacement supplier in the USSR, has established a center to handle exhibitions, information distribution, and assistance in obtaining replacement and component supplies. Such activities are supposed to reinforce existing contacts between West European suppliers of replacement and component parts to Soviet users and to inform Soviet machine manufacturers of possible suppliers in the FRG and elsewhere in the West. The actual servicing is handled by Soviet engineers and technicians trained in the FRG. The FRG is planning a joint venture with the Ordshonikidse tool manufacturing plant to supply and service replacement parts.

Technical consulting and service for CEMA customers takes place via company offices or increasingly so over national servicing organizations.

The establishment of trade missions, the formation of joint ventures as well as the building of assembly plants in CEMA countries are important instruments for Western firms to position themselves in these markets and to secure long-term stable trade relations.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Trade Problems With Developing Countries Viewed*90CH0033A Prague PRACE in Czech 17 Mar 90 p 1*

[Interview with Jaroslav Foltyn and Alois Holub by Michael Borovicka; place and date not given: "Expensive Friends?"]

[Text] Anyone who has visited an underdeveloped country is certain to have seen large social differences. On the one hand one sees modern architecture, streets teeming with expensive cars, a well-stocked market, and on the other hand dirty little alleys where people for whom a bicycle is a symbol of a decent standard of living reside. Or the less developed countries of the CEMA where, admittedly the social differences are smaller but shops yawn with emptiness and food is often only obtained with ration cards. Is this world a suitable business partner for us? As far back as 1968 a discussion started as to whether cooperation with these countries was profitable for us. Recently information has again reached the public about what Czechoslovak economic, scientific, and technical relations with developing nations of so-called socialist orientation are really like, relations that seem more like some kind of "international aid." Many people believe that cooperation with Third World countries is a burden to us, that we must get rid of.

On the table in front of me is a slim green book entitled "The Mirror of Developing Countries [2] The Economy" which was published last fall, and facing me across the table are its two authors, Eng. JAROSLAV FOLTYN, Dr. Sc., and Eng. ALOIS HOLUB, Dr. Sc. both from the Institute of Economics at the Czechoslovak Academy of Science.

[Foltyn] The attitude to relations with developing countries oscillates between two extremes, not only among the public but also in political and specialist circles. The first group considers them to be a segment of the world economy that has found itself in a disastrous and inescapable situation—like dear friends whom one must get rid of. At the other extreme we find the opinion, partly formed under the influence of the Seoul Olympics, that sees developing countries only through the prism of so-called newly industrialized nations to which S. Korea belongs. Its advocates believe that the numerous problems in our economy can easily be solved through cooperation with these countries. I consider both these extremes to be wrong. Developing countries are, admittedly, in a difficult economic situation, but it is not disastrous. Their industrialization process has not come to a standstill, and their integration into the process of scientific and technical revolution is continuing. On the other hand, outstanding economic successes among newly industrialized nations are not typical for the Third World as a whole.

[PRACE] Which countries do we now consider to be underdeveloped?

[Holub] We used to consider former colonies and other dependent countries to be underdeveloped. After World War II most of them attained political independence; later they also strove for economic autonomy, though they did not altogether succeed. This term primarily used to primarily refer to countries that were trying to introduce a market economy and cooperation with the West.

[PRACE] Does this mean that countries which, so to speak, followed the path of socialism, but were just as backward, were not included among the underdeveloped nations?

[Holub] No. It applies to the Chinese People's Republic, Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam, and to a certain extent even to Laos, the Korean People's Republic, and others. However, there is yet another group of countries with so-called socialist orientation, for example Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and others which we included among the developing nations because they were decisively linked to the international division of labor with the West. It is a fact that the more developed countries of CEMA all supported them. But it was more a matter of unilateral aid than mutually profitable cooperation. To the extent that we dealt with these problems at the Institute, we encountered unimaginable difficulties because much of the information on this cooperation, or to be more exact, aid was secret. Nevertheless, our analyses led to the recommendation that when dealing with these countries, we must turn from aid to mutually profitable cooperation.

[PRACE] The fact remains that our help did not pull these countries out of the morass of backwardness anyway. But is there an example where Western developed countries gave the same kind of unilateral support to an underdeveloped country?

[Holub] Yes. Those very countries that are now considered to be newly industrialized nations received considerable support from foreign powers during the fifties and sixties. Naturally this aid was also politically motivated, but the difference is that these countries succeeded in making exceptionally good use of it for their own development. Among other things, it was a matter of demonstrating that the path they had chosen was better than that chosen by the Korean People's Republic or mainland China.

[Foltyn] Today there are already 68 countries throughout the world associated with the European Community on the basis of the Lome agreements. These relations must

be seen as a form of aid or profitable cooperation, otherwise these developing countries would not stay in the union. What is interesting is that they include countries with a socialist orientation, for example Ethiopia. In other words, developing countries followed the principle that they had to make use of every opportunity offered. In CEMA lobbies, there was talk about the necessity to find some "socialist equivalent of the association." But the CEMA did not have the economic strength to realize something like that. The relationship of CEMA to countries with a socialist orientation followed tortuous paths. The lack of a conception went to such extremes that no one was even able to name all these countries. There was talk about six or seven so-called core countries, which had to be kept afloat at all costs, and then there was a group of other countries. Altogether there were about 20. It sounds like a joke, but they were officially only listed once, and that was on the first page of PRAVDA at the time of Yuri Andropov's funeral. Individual countries drifted into this group and then drifted away again, according to the political and ideological views prevailing at that moment.

[Holub] Admittedly a distinction was made between first generation countries—those that came into being in the sixties—and second generation countries—those from the seventies—but a number of the countries from the sixties changed their orientation. The most typical examples are Egypt and Ghana.

[PRACE] Surely these changes meant economic losses for us?

[Holub] We recorded such losses even with countries where the socialist orientation could not be presumed: for example, Indonesia, which at the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties was considered to be a very dependable and reliable partner. However, in 1965, as a consequence of its very ineffective economy, as well as for political reasons, there was a coup d'etat. Then, of course, it was extremely difficult to get financial remuneration for the resources we had exported to it. In the second half of the sixties it seemed that these resources were irretrievably lost. But later we succeeded in getting regular payments, and now we are successfully developing economic relations with that country.

[PRACE] Therefore one could say that cooperation with developing countries is rather like playing the lottery. For example, last fall, when former Prime Minister Adamec was in Iraq, the media wrote about our uncollectible debts in that country. What is going to be done about that?

[Foltyn] We have more than a billion dollars worth of more or less "frozen" outstanding debts in the Arab countries alone. There are several commercial and political steps that could be taken to solve the situation, including selling the debts to a third party at a reduced price. This means that a third country would buy the outstanding debt from us, and would start paying it off in

money or goods. For instance, the South Korean Daewoo car that you see on our roads is a result of such a transaction.

[Holub] In this case the triangle was made up of Libya, South Korea, and Czechoslovakia. During the oil glut, South Korea was one of Libya's major suppliers and Libya paid it in crude oil. Czechoslovakia also exported to Libya, and for years its outstanding debts were paid in hard currency, because it was more profitable for us to get crude oil from the USSR. When the price of crude oil fell, Libya continued to pay its debts to South Korea in crude oil, but it did not have enough foreign currency to settle its debts with us. Under these circumstances, it was to our benefit to transfer a part of the debts to South Korea which, by exporting cars to Czechoslovakia, was able to get a foothold on our market that had been virtually closed for political reasons, and that it had been striving to enter. The press announced that so far the agreement was for 3,000 cars, but this number may not be final, since both economic and political relations between both our countries are beginning to develop propitiously.

[PRACE] As a contrast to this, we have problems with Cuba, a CEMA member. Are there any prospects at all for cooperation with Cuba and Vietnam, CEMA members, who have the standard of developing countries?

[Holub] It may even take on the appearance of mutual advantages. It is not merely a question of exchanging goods. For instance, Vietnam not only has considerable mineral wealth, it also has enormous potential as far as tourism is concerned. It has beautiful beaches and a clean sea. Some Western agencies are already exploiting this; our country so far has had an active Agrotour, but that has not exhausted our options.

[PRACE] And what about the workers who are brought in from Vietnam?

[Holub] I believe that is a thing of the past. The former management system and the extensive development of the economy made a certain amount of overemployment possible. This overemployment will be reduced, and ultimately eliminated when we go over to a market economy.

[Foltyn] Despite the antipathies which these countries evoke in some of our fellow citizens, one must not ignore the long-term geopolitical and economic interests of our state. In a broader sense, Vietnam in particular can act as a bridge to ASEAN and the thriving association of some Southeast Asian countries. In the same way, Mongolia can be seen as a kind of bridge to South Korea, Ethiopia, Africa and Cuba, and the countries of Latin America.

[PRACE] How can cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the countries of the Third World be made more effective?

[Foltyn] In my opinion there are roughly four groups of problems. To start with, our relationship toward the

balance of trade must change. Until now the premise prevailed that it must be active, but this activity was only on paper, since we were often dealing with uncollectible debts. It is necessary to admit that a balance can temporarily remain passive. Secondly, we should improve the efficiency of our structure of goods, in other words we should also purchase some of their products and semifinished goods, and thus save our qualified and relatively expensive work force. Thirdly, we should make the territorial structure more efficient; that is, we should concentrate on countries with good prospects, and countries that belong to the larger economic sphere, and not to cooperate exclusively with the most backward ones. Fourthly, we must change to higher forms of cooperation. This means, for example, shifting from the simple exchange of goods to joint ventures.

[PRACE] At a press meeting on 29 January 1990 President Vaclav Havel confirmed that Czechoslovakia's export of arms will gradually be reduced. For many decades weapons were a substantial export commodity and a large number of them streamed from us to developing countries. Won't this decision have a negative effect on our economy? And can the volume of this trade be precisely expressed in numbers?

[Holub] It is true that Czechoslovakia is considered to be one of the world's major arms exporters. However, the present political development in the world is heading toward peaceful cooperation, which objectively weakens our country's status in this area. One can expect a worldwide decrease in the arms trade. Another factor is the reality that our country has technologically lagged behind the rest of the world in arms production, as it has in other areas. At this time I cannot see any great prospects for this export activity. Its former task of creating foreign exchange resources for our country will diminish. In the past the arms trade was useful partly because it was paid for immediately, weapons were not delivered on long-term credit. However this boom period is over, and therefore the advantage it brought is gone.

[PRACE] Let us now turn from specific problems to more general questions. How did our trade with developing countries evolve over the last decades?

[Holub] When we started to trade with them in the fifties, the situation was very different from what it is now. At that time what was called "structural complementarity" prevailed. The developing countries were essentially agricultural, they were able to supply agricultural products, and raw minerals when the need arose, while we had a developed processing industry. At that time trade with developing countries made up 15 percent of our foreign trade. Now it is merely 5 percent.

[PRACE] Why is that?

[Holub] A process of industrialization is taking place in the Third World. In the first phase these countries started to produce a number of products they used to obtain from us. In the second phase they wanted to

export many of these industrial products. In our country the process of industrialization evolved without taking these trends into consideration. And thus the complementarity of import and export was impaired. Basically, we maintained a so-called colonial import structure. For a long time we refused to purchase industrial products from these countries, and demanded semifinished products and raw materials—a situation that no longer satisfied them. We protected our industry against the competition of such imports, and this led to a conflict of interests, and in some cases developing countries considered our attitude to be discriminatory.

[Foltyn] We could be importing jute sacks from Pakistan and Bangladesh. But we stubbornly only import the raw materials and produce the sacks here, although it is less profitable. It would mean eliminating an inefficient industry and transferring the workers elsewhere, which would mean changes that the past rigid economic model would have had great difficulty in making.

[PRACE] As we have already mentioned, our trade with the less developed members of the CEMA and with some developing countries with a socialist orientation has the character of unilateral aid. How will current political developments affect these relations?

[Foltyn] As you know, CEMA member countries recently decided in Sofia that they would transact all accounting in easily convertible currencies. I think this is a vital decision.

[PRACE] But where will the economically weakest states get the currencies? After all, they have even greater difficulties than we do in obtaining them. For example, what will Cuba do?

[Foltyn] It will have to follow our example and open up to the world and to regional cooperation. Despite Fidel Castro's impassioned statements about being the last bastion of revolution, that country will have to cooperate more with the world, particularly with the countries in the Latin American sphere. Opening up to the world will probably also have an impact on the domestic political developments of these countries.

[PRACE] Finally I would like to return to the problem of the advantages or disadvantages of cooperation with countries of the Third World.

[Foltyn] I believe that its overall inefficiency stems from the inadequacy and inefficiency of our economic model in the past. In an economic system without a concept one cannot expect a conceptual and reasonable economic policy, particularly toward developing countries. As we have already mentioned, trade with these countries does carry a certain risk, not only for us, but also for developed Western countries. However, even small economies comparable to ours, such as those of the Benelux countries, enter this risk without misgivings. Such problems cannot shake a smoothly operating economy. As statistics show, the developed Western economies ordinarily have ten times greater outstanding debts with developing

countries than Czechoslovakia has. But their governments and banks do not dramatize this because these relations also bring substantial advantages for them, such as ensuring a steady supply of raw materials and semifinished products, and also the opening up of markets or support at international negotiations result from these commitments. When Fidel Castro demanded that developing nations' debts be totally and completely annulled, he met with no success, even in the Third World because it is not in the interest of any of the deciding powers in world economics. Such a step would ultimately probably backfire on the developing countries themselves. And what about our trade with these countries? In world economics the principle that no one gets anything for free applies, and we have frequently violated this principle.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

FRG Financial Expert on Prospects, Problems for GDR Economy

90GE0045A Dresden SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG
in German (Supplement) 9 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Prof Dr Kurt Biedenkopf by Juergen Schnell and Thomas Kaulfuss; place and date not given: "Union of All Germans Obligated To Clear Deficits; SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG Discussed This and Other Questions With Economic Expert Prof Dr Kurt Biedenkopf, Member of the FRG Bundestag and of the CDU Executive Board"—bulleted list is SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG introduction]

[Text]

- Does the FRG have to pay compensation?
- Is the economy of the GDR ready for the scrap heap?
- How can the flow of resettlers be stopped?
- Can the much discussed currency and economic union be realized immediately?
- According to the DPA [German press agency], more than 120,000 resettlers have come to the Federal Republic since the beginning of the year. Is that supposed to be the solution or will the Germans in the East find the courage for a new beginning?

[SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG] A few weeks ago, the Bremen historian Prof. Dr. Arno Peters caused a sensation with his plan for reparation settlement. In the same context, the mass media also reported on your suggestion for an equalization of the burdens of the Federal Republic towards the GDR. What were the ideas that this was based on?

[Biedenkopf] My comments regarding this problem were quite independent of those of Mr. Peters. What he published was an attempt to derive a claim from the reparation payments up to 1953. I do not consider this to be particularly helpful as, in the first place, he does not take into account the reparation payments made by the FRG, which were incredibly high, as well as the burden

balancing payments and the so-called partition costs which the FRG had to bear.

Secondly, it is always very questionable to calculate interest for this type of claims, to treat them like capital. The difference in reparation payments is not the cause of the current problems in the GDR economy. It is primarily the Stalinistic power politics, the centrally planned economy and the one-party rule which led to the fact that a considerable part of the basic capital of the GDR has been used up.

[SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG] Thus, your suggestion for the equalization of burdens is based on different premises?

[Biedenkopf] To me it is crucial: The union of all Germans is now obligated to clear up the resulting deficits. According to the principle of justice it now depends on the contribution by everyone according to his ability, based on the per capita productivity of the population. And, according to concurring estimates, the ratio between the FRG and the GDR is between 10:4 and 10:5. The productivity in the Federal Republic is about 2.5 times higher. Thus, grossly simplified, our per capita contribution should be 2.5 times that of the citizens of the GDR.

Without taking private investments into account, I am basing this on total public payments of between DM60 and 80 billion in the early years, which would naturally decrease as the economy of the GDR is revitalized. After all, to the same extent that the GDR economy gets into gear, is restructured and becomes more efficient, it will be able to create capital, to finance its own public costs. At the present time it is not able, or barely so, to do this. For this reason the Federal Republic must assume an essential part of these payments.

To me, this appears to be a much more reasonable justification than the derivation from old reparations plus interest, as the grave problems for the GDR appeared only a long time after the termination of the reparation payments in 1953.

[SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG] Do you see any realistic chance that the current government of the Federal Republic can bring itself to pay the amounts of money you cited?

[Biedenkopf] There is no alternative. It has to be done as a joint action by all Germans. The people in the GDR will also have to make a very important contribution, the value of which is much less discussed. They have to be prepared to stay here and to participate.

[SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG] In your opinion, what path should now be chosen by the GDR? Or do you see, as do many of your compatriots, economic capitulation as the only way out?

[Biedenkopf] I consider the idea of economic capitulation to be wrong and disastrous. People cannot be motivated by being forced to capitulate. However, this is

not even under discussion. The responsible producers, those who take the initiative, have to be won over to this joint action. The Federal Republic can contribute its economic power, its stock of knowledge, its integration into the EC; and the citizens of the GDR have to contribute their initiative, their work, their readiness to really cooperate. This nonmaterial action is the key to success.

[SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG] A possible future action as a bridge to the East European markets should not be forgotten.

[Biedenkopf] The Federal Republic has a great interest of its own in the success of this joint action. On the one hand, in order to avoid East-West migration which also leads to considerable political problems in the Federal Republic as well as to considerable costs. On the other hand, you are absolutely right: The GDR is an excellent industrial location, a kind of bridge to the eastern and southeastern markets of Europe. For this reason I always consider it important to tell the people there that they do have something to offer.

[SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG] What actually is your current evaluation of the efficiency of the GDR economy? There are many in the FRG who try to pronounce it totally ready for the trash heap.

[Biedenkopf] Measured against the current state of development it is not efficient, at least for the most part. The economy does not exist anyway. In no way can I compare Bitterfeld to Robotron or Buna to Polygraph. It is thus necessary to proceed systematically case by case. It has to be researched as to where there is potential for development, where there is knowledge of international trade. The idea is that the 16 million citizens of the GDR can develop their economy to such an extent that it will become competitive. In any case, this should be the aim of the GDR after 1991, as the Soviet Union wants to do its accounting on a dollar basis in CEMA from that time on. What is really important is the knowledge and ability, the skilled workers, the engineers, the technicians—their level of qualification is—in part—really exceptional.

[SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG] However, many of them still leave the country. You just appealed to the people to stay. But, from experience, appeals have not had much of an effect. In your opinion, what concrete measures could stop this emigration?

[Biedenkopf] This continuous stream of resettlers is actually the main reason for the suggestion to realize the economic and currency union. This means the integration of the economy of the Federal Republic and that of the GDR; however, the existing differences must be taken into account.

First of all, this means the conversion of all payments 1:1 and of the savings accounts 1:1. The monetary capital of the GDR citizens with about M 160 billion is not very great in comparison to that of the FRG citizens with

DM2600 billion. Thus, this should not cause any problems. It also has to be taken into account that the current lack in supply of goods does not have to be covered by the FRG alone, but rather by the whole European market at least. I think that this magnitude does not matter. Just imagine, if the GDR is accepted into the EC, the population there will grow by five percent, the gross national product by about two percent. The latter does not even correspond to the annual growth up to now. This means that the flexibility and the size of the market into which the GDR is entering is such that its entry will not cause any disturbance whatever.

[SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG] However, this alone would not eliminate the existing productivity and wage differentials. Thus, will the GDR still be a low wage country?

[Biedenkopf] Something certainly has to be done to avoid that. It is not possible to burden the incomes in the GDR with the same public costs for the state, for the communities and such as in the FRG. Until the productivity has been adjusted, the incomes must largely be exempt from taxation. During this transition period the FRG has to pay for a high financial deficit. I don't see this as aid from us but rather as an investment in the common task before us. It is the precondition for your population to say: OK this is fun again. If we cannot attain this, then nothing will work. The sooner one realizes that there is no alternative to this, but that this is a duty we have to assume as a consequence of the great liberation of the people in the GDR, the better it is.

Besides: We also have wage differentials, i.e., in some areas the wages for the same work can be double those in other areas. However, this does not mean that people there fare twice as well, as the cost of living, e.g., in cities, is considerably higher than in rural areas.

[SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG] You have been talking about a large redistribution of income by the Federal Government. Where is this money to come from, will the Federal Republic go further into debt?

[Biedenkopf] Absolutely not. Such large historic tasks should not be passed off to one's grandchildren. That should be done by oneself, especially when one is capable of doing so. And there is no doubt about that, as we currently export DM80 to 100 billion in capital annually. For this reason, the assumption of other welfare benefits, such as pension increases and unemployment insurance, should not pose any problems. Thus, the current insecurity and worrying by large parts of the population of the GDR is completely groundless.

[SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG] Catch phrase: currency and social welfare union. In your opinion, what steps are needed on the path to an economic union?

[Biedenkopf] Most important is freedom of trade, the dismantling of the foreign trade monopoly, the ensuring of investments by stock companies. In this context, many people talk about a sellout. But it is exactly the opposite. If companies come into the GDR to invest,

they tie themselves to the fate of the country which they assist in the securing of work places. Thus, they are interested in things progressing well here. Obviously, they want to have a say, but in the interest of the success of those investments.

The GDR needs a new tax law, a new contract law. Overall, the economic and currency union should be established by summer. Only in this way will it be possible to rapidly get back on solid ground. The newly elected People's Chamber also should rapidly reestablish the constitutions of the various states and pass on the real estate property to the communities and states. This will establish a network of cooperation will between the states. In this manner unity can be established de facto, even if it has not been formally realized. The final execution of unification into a single country is not just for us to decide, due to the bloc ties of the two partial countries. This process will also be decided by the speed with which the two blocs dismantle by interweaving.

[SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG] A last question. You have accepted a guest professorship for ecological and social market economy at the Karl-Marx University in Leipzig. Lectures will begin in April. What prompted you to do this?

[Biedenkopf] The professorship should contribute to the presentation of the character and the structures of a social market economy order. In the meantime, almost all parties want to introduce an ecologically oriented market economy. Only very few actually know what this is.

In addition, I want to make it clear that our growing together is not a one way street. We can both learn from each other. The task—which, by the way, still requires a tremendous amount of preliminary work—consists of developing the GDR economy now to such an extent that it will fit into the economy of division of labor economy of Europe and the world. That does not mean that it has to resemble the economy of the Federal Republic. But it has to become competitive and suitable for Europe. I would like to make a contribution to this.

POLAND

Analysis Urges Farmers Not To Panic, Criticizes Continuing Monopolies

90EP0480B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
27 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by Edmund Szot: "Farming Without a Compass: The Strategy Is There, but Not Tactics"]

[Text] The creation of a firm currency, which is the principal goal of the currently implemented government economic program, has entailed an already evident recession, which will probably also extend to agriculture.

There, too, has arisen the phenomenon of apparent overproduction which, combined with the soaring prices

of farming equipment, fertilizers, and crop protectants, resulted in a decline in the productive activism of farmers. This manifests itself in the curtailment of purchases of means of production by the farms and the tendency to reduce the basic herd. A secondary consequence of the present situation in agriculture may be the abandonment of the production of producer goods for agriculture by certain plants, which would result in a further extensification of agriculture, that is, in the degradation of its production.

The special peril inherent in a recession in agriculture evolves around the fact that, once it begins here, it will grow in an avalanche-like manner and the subsequent recovery of the previous production level will take a very long time. Thus there exists the likelihood that, once the general economic situation improves and consumer purchasing power increases, this will come into conflict with an insufficient supply of foodstuffs, which has always in the past been a cause of tensions. Hence, farmers should bear in mind that the decline in the food demand will not be lasting, while the government, in its turn, should promote this belief in farmers by means of a more liberal economic and, especially, credit policy.

Such is the position of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Economy, and the views of the deputies belonging to the corresponding commission of the Sejm are similar. Another precondition for halting the decline in farm output is said to be the expansion of the exports of the current farm product surpluses and an increase in the state's participation in the procurement and processing of farm products. These postulates are quite justified and meeting them is not only in the interest of agriculture.

On the other hand, proposals in favor of the state's intervention in shaping the prices of the means of production, as well as demands for some guarantees of the permanence of all private farms, are groundless. In other words, revisions in the current agricultural policy are needed, but changes in the strategy are not. This domain of the economy, too, must be subjected to the operation of the ruthless laws of the marketplace. For nothing will serve better the positive selection of producers, and nowhere has a better way of improving output quality and reducing prices been found.

The widespread complaints of farmers about the ratio of food prices to the prices of the means of production may be due to the extent of their aggregate income, but they would not meet with understanding abroad, where that ratio is even less favorable to agriculture. For example, in order to buy a MF-255 tractor, a Swedish farmer has to sell 1,000 quintals of rye or 100 quintals of pork on hoof, whereas a Polish farmer can buy that tractor in return for the financial equivalent of 692 quintals of rye or 84 quintals of pork on hoof.

A U-914 tractor costs in Denmark as much as 1,557 quintals of barley or 175 quintals of pork on hoof,

compared with 1,125 and 129 quintals, respectively, in Poland. Let us emphasize that this concerns the same (i.e., Polish) tractors!

The difference consists in that a Danish farmer's farm is on the average five times as large as a Polish farmer's, and his productivity is on the average twice as high per hectare. His purchasing power is therefore about 10 times as high. Moreover, he has "on hand" whatever he desires: machinery, tractors, feeds, fertilizers, credit, and so on. Incidentally (?), has not a similar market begun to form in Poland? In our country, too, the farmer increasingly often no longer has to seek out merchandise and instead he must seek out money.

True, the financial encumbrances on agriculture have increased this year: the agricultural tax has been raised by a factor of 11, social security premiums by a factor of 17, and property insurance by a factor of 6. Relatively speaking, the rise in the prices of farm products has been slower than the rise in the prices of means of production. For this reason, a majority of farms has found itself in an extremely difficult situation, particularly considering that at the same time the demand for foodstuffs has declined markedly. The tribute laid by agriculture on the altar of balancing the budget may indeed prove to be beyond the strength of this field of the economy.

The unprofitability of farm production is moreover aggravated by the still existing monopoly organizations which dictate to farmers the prices for their products. The only consolation is that they now do this in a less coordinated manner. Thus, e.g., in some voivodships (e.g., Nowy Sacz or Tarnow, and generally in the south-eastern macroregion), farmers are paid 360-400 zlotys per liter of milk and dairy cooperatives there have problems in marketing dairy products, whereas in, e.g., Lomza Voivodship the procurement price per liter of milk is 800 zlotys and, strangely, there are no problems with sales of dairy products there.

A farmer from Rzeszow Voivodship would not, however, transport his milk to Olsztyn Voivodship, where he should be paid two to three times as much for it; he will not either sell it to anyone other than "his" dairy. But does he have any voice in the management of that dairy of "his"? How many penpushers does it employ? What is it doing to broaden the variety of its production and make it more attractive and pare its overhead? Little if at all, I fear. In the awareness of the average farmer the cooperative still is a "state" one and thus it is the state that pays him 400 zlotys for milk, while a liter of motor oil costs so much, and so on.

The atmosphere in the countryside is not good. This is demonstrated by the spectacular protests arising here and there, the letters to the editors of periodicals, to the radio, and to television. The mood of uncertainty and impotence is further fueled by various forces which wish the government far from well. In the opinion of observers, the government, too, is not without blame; to this day it still has not offered a lucid concept of

agricultural development. But a wise farmer does not get panicky. For after all, has there ever been a period in history when people could survive without eating?

Anti-Rural Policy Denied; Problems of Small Farmers Viewed

90EP0480A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish
28 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with Michal Wojtczak, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Food Economy, by Edmund Szot: "What Is the Peasant's Response?"]

[Text] [*RZECZPOSPOLITA*] The current agricultural policy of the government does not enjoy acceptance by the countryside. Farmers claim that the government has no policy on agriculture and is merely concerned with emptying the peasant's wallet as much as possible. What do you say to that?

[Wojtczak] I have heard this claim quite often. I do not agree with it, but I understand it as a reaction to the present difficult situation which is also due to the failure of farmers to understand the fundamental tasks that the administration has posed to itself in the first few months, their failure to understand that the aim of the government during the present period is neither to increase output nor to improve its quality, nor any other such thing, and that rather its fundamental aim is to create a [stable] currency and that all other measures are subordinated to this aim.

Thus the adopted hierarchy of values should be understood. In this context, the government's policy is neither anti-peasant nor anti-agricultural. A more explicit agricultural policy will simply have to be awaited.

[*RZECZPOSPOLITA*] A consequence of marketization, which has reduced the demand for food but contributed to a rise in the price of means of production, may be the petrification of the agrarian structure. Farms producing chiefly for the market will curtail their production, while small landholders will even more desperately hold on to their farms. This is being said...

[Wojtczak] For the time being nothing corroborates such opinions. And as for the structure, let me point out that any healthy economy relies on the strong, not on the weak. But the strong are not necessarily those who own 100 or 150 hectares but those who are doing good business. Besides, even the owner of a two-hectare farm may be a good businessman if he plants it, with, e.g., tomatoes. The government's program is addressed to people who can succeed in creating a production surplus. That is because the economy is healthy only when it produces a surplus. This is the underlying premise of the liberal system which we want to introduce in Poland.

[*RZECZPOSPOLITA*] So far there has been no incentive for farmers to overproduce.

[Wojtczak] That is one of the greatest legacies, or perhaps the greatest one, of the old system, which had not

encouraged individual initiative and even, on the contrary, destroyed it. This blockage also hindered personal growth, but probably the logic of the old system was not even concerned with it. Please consider that even now people are starting to explore ways in which to vent their resourcefulness and energies.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] But for the time being rural incomes have declined markedly and the acquisition of farm machinery and implements is declining... Mr. Minister, when, do you think, will the balance be tilted in the other direction and what will cause it?

[Wojtczak] The government's program allowed for a small decline in not only industrial output, trade, and services, but also agricultural output. However, in the case of agricultural output there also exists another peril, ensuing from its cyclic nature. You see, the biological cycle requires of the farmer investment outlays during the pre-vernal period with the funds earned from the previous year's harvest. The high inflation rate has resulted in that to many farms the present period is extremely difficult. The only way out is to endure, even with the help of the family or friends—although as a minister of state I am not supposed to speak that way.

The state has intervened in some ways to make it easier for the farmer to survive this difficult period; for example, by subsidizing the cost of fertilizers, crop protectants, and biological progress. Through the mediation of the Agricultural Market Agency the state will enable the farmer to sell his produce at prices assuring profitability. No other instruments of assistance will be introduced by the state, except perhaps preferential credit allowing for the seasonal nature of farm incomes. These all the preferences that farmers can count on, in the future too.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] The anticipated increase in agricultural labor productivity is going to raise the problem of a diversified development of the countryside. At present there is no rural organizer who might guide this development.

[Wojtczak] I had answered this as early as during the elections for the Parliament by telling farmers that they must become themselves the organizers of their work and life. They claimed that they lack dairies and slaughtering plants and other similar facilities of their own, but it is they themselves who must create this infrastructure; no one will help them in this. The state may support their efforts by providing credit and facilitating contacts, but the basic steps must be taken by the farmers themselves. Let them establish their own partnerships to market their production, let them jointly buy trucks and machinery and build their own milk collection stations.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] These intentions to modernize Polish agriculture rather conflict with the present situation of the Polish countryside, with the mentality of Polish farmers.

[Wojtczak] But please, I come from the same family as the Reverend Piotr Wawrzyniak, the first founder of farm cooperatives in Wielkopolska. He had accomplished this during an extremely difficult period of struggle against Germanization combined with a lower peasant awareness than that now characterizing the Polish society. I believe that nowadays there are many such Wawrzyniaks in Poland and that they will succeed in resurrecting the idea of genuine cooperatives, awakening the self-organizing ability of the rural society. For otherwise there would be a tragedy.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Mr. Minister, you have not answered the question as to when growth processes in agriculture can be expected.

[Wojtczak] I would prefer to answer a different question, namely, when will the decline be arrested? According to my estimates, this will occur late in March and early in April. Once farmers perceive that the currency has stabilized, and that the prices of means of production have stopped rising and in some cases even are dropping, interest in farm production will grow and the already evident desire to reduce its costs will be strengthened.

YUGOSLAVIA

Defects of Privatization Law

90EB0285A Zagreb *DANAS* in Serbo-Croatian 6 Feb 90 pp 28, 29

[Article by Ratko Boskovic: "A Step Above the Abyss"]

[Text] The advice given by young American professor Jeffry Sachs to Yugoslavia and Poland was very simple. Reform of the economy and society must be carried out at once "because you cannot cross an abyss in two jumps." This single step should instantaneously eliminate inflation of domestic currency and end additional printing of money. Convertibility of Yugoslav currency and complete privatization of the economy should also be introduced. "The socialist countries must resist the desire to try again to create a third development and political system of their own and must return directly to capitalism." Such is Professor Sachs' position.

Yugoslavia listened to the first part of Sachs' advice, and the results are contained in the most recent package of measures adopted by the Federal Executive Council [FEC]. Yugoslavia has no intention of following the second part of the advice about privatization of the economy.

As his predecessor Zivko Pregl stated in an interview given to *DANAS*, the government of Ante Markovic believes that the necessary conditions still have not been created for definitive resolution of the ownership question in Yugoslavia. In addition, it is not so easy to privatize an entire national economy, and a "social" one at that. All of Eastern Europe, and not just Yugoslavia, has been contorted over the question of what belongs to whom in it.

However, Yugoslavia alone of all East European countries continues to place the greatest emphasis on repeated attempts to find a third social system. The law on associated labor already enacted has been replaced by the law on enterprises, and so the rhetoric is market oriented, but nothing has changed. Enterprises continue to be self-managed. Not only has the new law on labor relations eliminated the basic means of accomplishing economic recovery of an enterprise (dismissal of surplus personnel). Now even craftsmen are entirely prevented from refusing anyone.

Lastly, conversion of publicly owned enterprises to privately owned ones has theoretically been made possible by the law on traffic in social capital, but absolutely nothing has been introduced into the system to encourage employees in the private sector to become privatized, and in particular no mechanism has been set up to force them to do so. The federal government reckons that the hunger for money itself will impel self-managers to seek out capitalists for themselves. It is just that it is not entirely clear what might make people with money and ideas share them with self-managers.

The liberalization of economic life has meanwhile contributed to an explosion of private entrepreneurship.

According to the most recent averaged statistical data kept by the Register of Enterprises of the District Economic Court in Zagreb, presented to us by the director of the Register, Bozidar Medved, the court has received 545 applications for registration of private businesses (with full liability), 169 applications for approval of the existence of limited liability companies, and 20 for partnerships.

Overwhelmed by this great number of applications, the Zagreb Register of Enterprises can receive the public only on Monday morning, and then it is impossible to get into its offices at all. People get there even before 5:00 in the morning to be able to obtain the information they want by 11:00. Few persons avail themselves of the quite ordinary option of mailing their applications to the court for registration.

Inasmuch as all work is done "by hand" (the federal government still has ordered no computerization whatever), it currently takes the Register as long as three to four weeks to issue a registration decision. One good thing, though, is that the procedure is extremely simple insofar as the Register is concerned. Any citizen (a "natural person") may establish and register as many enterprises as he wishes and engage in any activity (except those prohibited by law), at any address, with no employees or assets, and with a ridiculously small amount of money. Restrictions are applied only in certain highly specialized activities such as those in the construction industry and in certain public activities. For example, the Register was forced to reject the registration of businesses issuing video and audio cassettes, but the Stalinist atavisms in Yugoslav laws are expected to be expunged any day now.

People come here, says Bozidar Medved, to register a business without even being certain of the business they want or what activity it will engage in, just as they probably have no idea whatever just how big a project it is to start up and organize the legitimate operation of a business. The Register is not concerned with what subsequently becomes of newly registered businesses. It does not matter to it if the business engages in lawful commerce or not, must or must not obtain permits required by law from the appropriate inspection boards to begin operation, or if fictitious businesses are established or are set up to try to perpetrate some small-scale fraud, or again if they intend to grow into respectable multinational corporations.

Register personnel also do not enquire into reasons for setting up private businesses, but from daily conversations with their clients they gather that businesses are most often set up by tradesmen to whom municipal revenue administrations have become intolerable and by public sector professionals who have expended much time and talent for insultingly small remuneration and want to found conventional privately owned spinoff businesses based on experience and contacts acquired in a public sector enterprise.

And what is happening to the public sector in the meantime?

For who knows how many times in Yugoslavia, it is being "harmonized" with the new law. It is no longer under public ownership; now it operates with "public capital." The basic associated labor organizations are being converted to enterprises, the work organizations are breaking down into associated labor organization fiefs, and the composite associated labor organizations are exploding like supernovas and gathering again like cosmic dust.

All that was considered pathological under the self-management organization system of major associated labor entities (disparity of interests, lack of pooling of labor and money in new collective projects, nonexistence of collective development, and so on) is now becoming ossified as such. Any labor entity, even the smallest one, that believes it can do so and that it is good for it, establishes and registers itself as an independent enterprise based on the existing power structure. Complex organizations are appearing as a mere formality, in order to keep the easy chairs and to rescue the impression of someone's stature and importance.

"Earlier," explained Bozidar Medved, "the composite associated labor organizations had the sum of the activities of their parts as their activity. The law on enterprises has 'compounded' them somewhat differently. A composite enterprise now has activities and powers of its own that it registers, but they are not at the same time the activities of the enterprises that associate themselves. The association is superficial, formal, and 'optional'.

because 'associated' enterprises fully retain their independence and may leave the associated form any time they choose."

Although it is not part of his official qualifications, Bozidar Medved well knows whereof he speaks, because he daily studies the bylaws of the enterprises registered with the Economic Court in accordance with the enterprise law. Thus it has not escaped his attention that all at once composite enterprises are being established "to engage in automatic data processing." And pooled resources? "The first preference of associated enterprises would be to pool no resources at all," states Medved.

It is possible that when the FEC enacted the law on enterprises and the law on traffic in social capital (that is, on purchase of public sector enterprises) it thought that such an intermediate step toward privatization of the Yugoslav economy is necessary. But what do the practical results of the first months of privatization indicate about an intermediate step above an abyss?

Of the approximately 1,000 applications for registration of various forms of private businesses, the Zagreb District Economic Court has received only four for formalization of partnerships in which part of the capital is also invested in public sector associated labor, and has handed down only 15 decisions regarding establishment of limited liability companies in which the joint owners have also been socialized self-management officials. Consequently, if a natural, organic, market oriented privatization of the economy has been expected, there is no trace of it as yet.

It is also everywhere clear that there will be no such privatization. Why should a person who has saved his earnings in order to invest it share power in a business with people on the basis of their work for which they have been paid but have spent their pay? And this is the only model of privatization that has been crystallized as "fair" in public discussion of the subject, while division of shares or privatization free of charge is regarded as socially unjustified.

The turn of events, however, shows that purchase of public sector enterprises does not take place spontaneously, that their actual owners become their directors, without any investment of their own, and that talent and capital are migrating from the public to the private sector. If this process is carried to its extreme, the public sector will disintegrate in self-managed bickering and in time will fall apart completely. It is superfluous to note that this is socially impermissible, not because we should lament for the self-managed economy but because such a turn of events would not be developmentally and economically acceptable. The assets and the business partners of private businesses fail along with public sector enterprises; such failure is too large in scale and too important to be permitted to happen.

Consequently, the second part of Professor Sachs' advice should be adopted and put into practice, immediately and in its entirety, and at least privatization of the

economy should be carried out, largely by free distribution of certificates of ownership. This is neither a physical nor a tedious matter; even if their market price drops temporarily, at any rate they cannot fail.

Past Suppression of Initiative

90EB0285B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 6 Feb 90
pp 28, 29

[Article by Velimir Srica: "As Regards Initiative"]

[Text] In a well-known joke a certain poor man persistently prays to God every day, asking to win the lottery. The Almighty finally becomes fed up and yells down to him, "Stop all this praying and go out and buy yourself some luck."

The majority of Yugoslavs similarly direct the problems of growing poverty in the form of a prayer to Her Majesty Crisis, expecting the god of Reform to solve all the problems, not they themselves. Until some abstract System provides a solution, individuals sit calmly with their arms folded, increasingly resigned, hearts and heads immobilized in discontent.

The vulgar collectivism in which the system was everything and the individual nothing, under which destinies, ambitions, lives, and energy were sacrificed on the "altar of the revolution" in the name of higher goals, the State, Party, and Socialism as a sacred process, left deep scars and almost insoluble problems. Those who believed in different ideals, were unwilling to leave the "majority," and demonstrated readiness to do their own thinking and to operate independently and outside the system were persistently denounced and removed from public economic, political, or cultural life as pathological and unwanted growths on the homogeneous and united body of "healthy society."

Sometimes subtle but most often coarse mechanisms of vulgar collectivization in Yugoslavia over a period of decades have made the individual passive and pacific, have transformed him into an apathetic and obedient cog in the bureaucratic and political ideological machinery of the social system. So it has been that a tendency toward entrepreneurial spirit and personal initiative has broken like weak waves against the solid walls and concrete ensheathed banks of the dogma of strict normative limits, singlemindedness, and autarchic practice, until the sea of ideas finally has calmed down and been transformed into a stable swamp of mediocrity and lack of ambition.

There are many manifestations of our decades long real neglect of the entrepreneurial mindset and individuality in favor of servile uniformity of thought and vulgar collectivism.

As one such manifestation we may cite the method of distributing aid to the undeveloped. Being in the form of a gift with no strings attached, it neither requires commitment on the part of the recipient nor heightens his responsibility. One who is constantly given fish rather

than being helped to learn how to fish will not develop the independence and enterprise to obtain food for himself.

A system under which the unfit are continually rehabilitated and kept alive without criticism acts to discourage individual initiative and any attempt to achieve distinction and create elitism. A society which is concerned predominantly with the weak has condemned its "strong" and capable to dissatisfaction, exploitation, nonuse, and ultimately excommunication. A blood transfusion into cadavers does them no good but makes the living ever weaker.

A singleminded system recognizes and produces only "regime" scientists while singling out and disabling others. This contributes to the creation of an apologetic conscience incapable of critical evaluation of reality but capable of deliberately engaging in defense and pleading for any politically supported ideology. Hence it is no wonder that many of our politicians and scientists who, when waving the flag of the contractual economy, took the lead in the crusade against liberals, advocates of the marketplace, profit makers, or democrats are today the harshest critics of the past and again fanatic apologists for a market future and "new socialism."

Promotion of the obedient bureaucrat, who always knows what may and may not be done and accordingly is eager to obey the wishes of the current holders of political power, for decades guided a system under which impersonality dominated over individuality.

The vulgar collectivization under discussion here is based on many other rules. For example, it recognizes and accepts only the "organized" or "institutionalized" individual. Failure to belong to a formal institution is equivalent to disqualification of an individual, a "free lance," whose thinking consequently is not to be taken seriously. In addition, if such a person criticizes the prevailing attitudes, it is assumed that there is some enemy organization or other "dark force" behind him.

The vulgar collective system also has many organizational forms. One of them is the contractual or so-called socialized state. Everything in it is based on an elaborate, enormous, costly, and totally inoperative delegate

system and on concepts such as "free exchange of labor," "pooling of labor and funds," or "a self-managed interest organizational system." The result of operation of such a system is mediocrity of standards, unprofessional voluntaristic administration and decisionmaking, inefficiency and irrationality, and concealment of responsibility for all failures.

In addition, the system has tried to silence persons who do not think like it ("the opposition") or to suppress the individuality of all who have not been willing to accept obediently the ideological "rules of the game." This has been done by means of very flexible interpretation of "political" and "verbal" offenses, something that has led and still leads to political trials, wholly alien phenomena in the democratic and pluralistic societies of our day.

A system that has taken over and transferred all specific responsibilities from the individual logically has also deprived him of the right and possibility of exerting equal influence (excepting, of course, the small number of those "more equal" or "the select").

Fortunately, awareness that we have been in a blind alley and that all the elements of the economic, political, and social system must be redefined in the constitutional changes and practical reform measures is continuing to grow. Perhaps we have come to understand that we will not see any better if all of us look in the same direction. Rather than the impersonal and the obedient, we are now looking for the enterprising and the individualized.

But can such a strange bird as the enterprising person be hatched on the scorched earth of countless examples of vulgar collectivist practices that are against individualism and intolerant of differences? Have the several decades of the contrary experiences (just described) not "genetically" deformed our consciousness and killed all beginnings of the enterprising mindset?

Only activation of market mechanisms, promotion of political pluralism, and opening up to the influences of modern European and world integration can answer this question. But the answers will not fall down to us from out of the sky. We must be enterprising and at least buy some luck.

INTRABLOC

Problems of Hungarian Minorities in Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia

90CH0037A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 1 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Tibor Bogdan (Bucharest), Vince Toth (Ujvidek [Novi Sad]) and Evelyn Forro (Prague): "The Pathogens: Anti-Hungarianism and Nationalism"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] Actually, the debate on the lot of the Hungarians stranded outside our borders has never ceased, but only now has it gained such wide publicity. In the countries where Hungarian minorities are living, the majority nations are accusing them in many instances of nationalism, chauvinism, separatism, and of striving for territorial revisions. The ethnic Hungarians living there cannot emphasize often enough that they are entitled to what they are demanding, particularly Hungarian schools and unrestricted use of their native language. In the following we offer, without any claim to completeness, a review of the problems confronting ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries.

Who Wants Separate Sidewalks?

More than two months after the events of last December, Romania's national minorities still feel that for them the revolution is late, that somehow real democracy has failed to reach them so far. Fulfillment of their legitimate, fundamental, essential demands not only has yet to come, but is encountering ever greater obstacles, as if disproving the comprehensive process of democratization that is unfolding within Romanian society. The sad fact is that centuries-old organized incitement, particularly the anti-Hungarian propaganda that has been honed to perfection in recent decades, has not ceased without a trace. Knowing what the "diagnosis" is, one does not need a doctorate in political science to establish that convalescence will be a lengthy and painful process.

The "pathogens"—anti-Hungarianism, nationalism, and chauvinism—find a favorable culture medium even now, under the radically changed conditions since the revolution's victory. This is because the forces with an interest in maintaining and "updating" the discord that has always been fueled artificially between the two peoples, and which has brought immense suffering, so much trouble, and such heavy losses to the countries of the Danube Basin, are still active—and not just due to the forces of inertia. Under their influence, the majority Romanian population is responding with growing incomprehension, suspicion and, moreover, outright aversion to every action of the ethnic Hungarians, who finally are coming to after 70 years of oppression, humiliation, and forced silence, and—believing in a democratic transformation—are openly asserting their legitimate rights.

This is how it could possibly come about that the events—the demonstrations and counterdemonstrations, the endless consultations and debates degenerating into acrimonious disputes—which the demands of Romania's ethnic Hungarian population touched off have not been devoid of hostile, nationalist overtones, sometimes even from official or semiofficial circles. The National Peasant Party branded as excessive the ethnic Hungarians' demands for the restoration of instruction in their native language and of all-Hungarian schools, which had been left to atrophy and become Romanianized, and in part had been liquidated, during the years of the dictatorial regime. On his visit to France, Deputy Prime Minister Petre Roman reproached the national minority, which had obediently remained silent for 70 years, for its alleged intolerance. And the Vatra Romanesca Federation, formed in Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures], declared at its mass rally that the time was ripe for the two million ethnic Hungarians to return to Asia, the homeland that the federation's spokesmen had designated for them.

There is no progress at present on resolving the "school issue," the separation of the Romanian and Hungarian educational institutions. On the initiative of Deputy Education Minister Attila Palfalvi, since removed from office, a few Hungarian schools were indeed restored in January, but the process has ground to a halt on the basis of the ministry's decree: The decision has been postponed until the autumn, the start of the new school year.

The immediate separation of the schools and the reinstatement of instruction in the native language to its legitimate rights as soon as possible are at present the most pressing and urgent problems awaiting solution for Romania's ethnic Hungarian population. All of this, of course, is not so simple and is by no means free of grievances. The students and teachers of the Romanian grades, which were forced upon the Hungarian schools, regard the request for immediate separation as an ultimatum, and feel that it is injurious to require them to move to other schools. Yet at one time, precisely 70 years ago, when the Romanians themselves were still a national minority, their leading intellectuals set as their most important goal the expansion of instruction in the student's native language. The schools they established then in Transylvania—in Balazsfalva [Blaj] and Belenyés [Belus]—played a decisive role in preserving Romanian national identity. But now they are branding similar aspirations of the ethnic Hungarians as separatism.

This is a dangerous accusation because, besides stigmatizing the legitimate demand for separate instruction, it could also mean territorial separation. In any event, it provides an opportunity for such polarized arguments as the not exactly pro-Hungarian leaders of the aforementioned Vatra Romanesca have been using. Moreover, they have done so specifically in their appeal to their "Hungarian brothers and sisters" for fraternal cooperation. It reads in part: "We understand your desire to be able to study in your native language, but we fail to understand your feverish haste to separate the schools.

Where will this separatism end? Will there be, as some hotheads imagine, separate enterprises and institutions, separate hospitals? Separate lunchrooms and restaurants? Separate means of transportation? Will one of us be using the sidewalk on one side of the street, and the other one the sidewalk on the opposite side?"

Linguistically Hybrid Citizens

No issue has ever rallied the ethnic Hungarians of the Vajdasag [Vojevodina] more than the new Education Law has.

Its antecedents may be summed up briefly as follows: The educational reform that consumed ten graduating classes was introduced in Yugoslavia in 1975. Confusion and experimentation remained characteristic throughout of the by-now-notorious system of specialized secondary education. It also had another result: the gradual withering away of the schools providing instruction in minority languages, due to the absence of "qualified teachers and interested students." One after another, the Hungarian secondary schools closed. Naturally, there was no question of closing this or that Hungarian secondary school by administrative order.

A further serious consequence of the system of specialized secondary education, especially for the national minorities, was that the classical secondary schools virtually ceased. This reduced to a minimum the training of intellectuals from the ranks of the national minorities, including the ethnic Hungarians. Although such obscure professional designations as "culturologist" were retained, not even the best-informed people knew what to make of such specialists, let alone the graduates' educational level.

When they recognized the breakdown in the system of secondary education, which basically had functioned well for decades, albeit not faultlessly, the powers that be turned to yet another educational reform, one that applied practically to the entire country. But let us confine ourselves to Serbia, which has the most populous national minorities on its territory. What happened there?

There, too, the objective was to cover the entire republic with the network of a uniform educational system. Thus the Serbian educational reform also zeroed in on the Vajdasag and the southern province of Kosovo, the status of both having changed according to the letter of the new Serbian constitution that was promulgated about this time last year. From 1976 on, a separate Education Law applied to the Vajdasag where four national minorities (Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians, and Ruthenians) are living, in addition to the majority nations. The new uniform Serbian law rescinded that separate law.

Well, in the course of drafting the new law, official circles introduced several proposals at which the national minorities pricked up their ears. In the final outcome, it was these proposals that led the ethnic Hungarians of the

Vajdasag to gather 17,120 signatures on a petition addressed to the deputies of the Serbian Parliament, who were to vote on the legislative bill.

According to one proposal, at least 30 students would have been needed to form a parallel minority language class in grade schools. The previous minimum was 15 students. The local Hungarian language dailies objected and the proposal was rejected, but not without comments or protests.

Another edifying proposal, likewise in the embryonic stages of enacting the new law, would have required future teachers of minority language classes, hence also of the Hungarian ones, to complete one or two years of teachers' college with Serbian as their language of instruction. The reasoning behind this proposal was that everyone had to have a good command of the language most commonly used in Serbia. It is unnecessary to dwell on the foreseeable serious consequences had this proposal been adopted. Fortunately, it too was rejected.

In this context, the following is undoubtedly noteworthy: According to various official statistics, grade school enrollment of national minority students receiving instruction in their native language has sharply declined in the Vajdasag in recent years. In the case of ethnic Hungarian students, grade school enrollment dropped by more than 4,000 between the 1976-77 and the 1988-89 school years. In 1989, for one reason or another, 6,301 ethnic Hungarian students did not avail themselves of the opportunity to enroll in classes in which Hungarian would have been the language of instruction. In the overwhelming majority of the cases the reasons were not subjective ones.

In light of these facts, the petition that over 17,000 parents (including non-Hungarians) signed in barely a week evoked exceptionally wide response. The signatories requested the Serbian Parliament, which was to enact Serbia's new uniform Education Law, to take into consideration the special situation of the national minorities within the republic. All they wanted with their petition was the guaranteeing of instruction in the national minorities' native languages. The petition or the act of signing it was not directed against any nation or other national minority. Some bodies felt at the time that, by gathering signatures, the sponsors of the petition were stirring up unrest among the population. Therefore these bodies disapproved of the petition, practically without having read it.

Reflecting on the events, the local national minority press found food for thought in what the "zealots" had disapproved of and why. It went on to say that, according to the party's standpoint, the nationality question had to be regarded as solved, even though one felt now and then that there still were things to be done. Everyone did what the party told him to do. Meanwhile, the enrollment of national minority students in grade school continued to decline, and the secondary school sections providing instruction in minority languages

withered away, one after another. The children with opportunities for various combinations of bilingualism became unilingual, mostly "linguistically hybrid" citizens.

And what became of the petition? Despite the wide response in the press and in party and political circles, there was no reply to the petition from any quarter. The deputies of the Serbian Parliament acted as if the petition had never existed. In late January they passed Serbia's new Education Law. Thereby secondary education unquestionably became uniform on the republic's entire territory. But the legislators failed to take into consideration the peculiarities of the national minorities, the educational traditions of the ethnic Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians, and Ruthenians in the Vajdasag. Thus the opportunities for the national minorities' assimilation have become broader, rather than narrower.

Either Your Seat or Your Conscience

"A new form of state totalitarianism is developing in Czechoslovakia, and democracy is being snubbed day by day. That, after all, is the tradition in Czechoslovakia, and it is foolish to believe that democracy ever existed here." I heard Miklos Durai utter these bitter words, shortly after the bicameral Federal Assembly passed the new Electoral Law. In other words, the new regime has not undone what the party-state accomplished, namely the suppression of national minorities. By law, a party or movement must get at least five percent of the vote to win a seat in the Federal Assembly. Already the drawing of the election districts reveals that the national minorities' interests have largely been ignored; indeed, there are indications of some sort of purpose in placing the national minorities at a disadvantage. And the legislative bill's debate clearly showed that there is democracy only for the majority. Four ethnic Hungarian deputies—Zoltan Sido, Gyula Popely, Miklos Durai, and Erika Vitez—introduced an amendment to waive the five-percent threshold for the national minorities, but it was voted down. Moreover, sarcastic remarks were made to the amendment's sponsors in the corridor. Returning to her seat after addressing the chamber, Erika Vitez found a note on her desk which read: "If Czechoslovakia is not good enough for you, you can always move permanently to the other bank of the Danube, Tisza, or Ipoly. And if you are not familiar with what 'democratic rights' the Republic of Hungary guarantees its national minorities, hop over there and find out. Szuros, Pozsgay, and Nemeth will gladly brief you." It was typical of the atmosphere that Josef Kucerak, a member of the Public Against Violence movement's coordinating committee in Slovakia, threatened to bar Durai from the Federal Assembly for his speeches in defense of minority rights. When Durai replied that he was merely following the dictates of his conscience, he was told that he would have to abandon either his seat or his conscience.

All of this indicates that signs of the suppression of national minorities can be found not only in Slovakia but also in Prague, and even in the Federal Assembly.

Therefore one may justifiably ask: What sort of democracy is this if it refuses to recognize the principle of equality?

The only thing we can do is to campaign vigorously so as to ensure that ethnic Hungarian deputies win seats in the Federal Assembly, in spite of everything. Hopefully, the Coexistence Movement will have a chance of winning seats. This, incidentally, is not exclusively an ethnic Hungarian movement, but a truly panethnic one that also welcomes Germans, Ruthenians, Poles, and the other national minorities. The indications are that it will be able to rally large masses, and it is by no means indifferent that it enjoys the full support of CSE-MADOK [Cultural-Social Association of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia]. Nearly 4,000 persons attended the rally this movement held in Zseliz [Zeliazovce] recently. It is not known at this time what election tactics the Independent Hungarian Initiative, formed immediately after the "velvet" revolution, will employ. To some extent it is committed to the Public Against Violence movement, but there are signs that the links between them will loosen because their interests differ.

It is a long standing problem that the federal government does not have a minister of nationalities. There is only a Committee on Nationalities, headed by Jan Carnagursky, the deputy prime minister. The choice is not a very apt one, because he is far from impartial. This is in part because he is the leader of the Christian Democrats in Slovakia, and it would not be in his interest to have the national minorities win votes away from his party. And in part this is because he is rumored to have made several anti-Hungarian statements in the past. And the promised changes have not been made within the Slovak Government itself: The posts of deputy minister have not been filled by ethnic Hungarians in the ministries of culture and education. The Ministry of Education does have a deputy minister who is an ethnic Hungarian, but he is merely in charge of economic affairs. There are also plans to restore, within the Chancellery of the Slovak Government, the Nationalities Secretariat that was gradually dismantled after 1970. But first it will be necessary to reorganize the government's advisory body, the Nationalities Council, to ensure that it will propose specific measures with due consideration for the interests and legitimate demands of the national minorities.

One of the most pressing problems is education, the area most neglected during the past 15 to 20 years. A "result" of this neglect will be a shortage of at least 2,000 Hungarian-speaking teachers by the turn of the millennium. The only solution would be to establish a Mor Jokai University in Komarom [Komarno]. The establishment of a separate main directorate concerned only with educational matters would also be necessary.

The voicing of all these problems occasionally evokes rabid anti-Hungarianism in Slovakia. Especially dangerous is the Stur Society: Its membership is not very large, but it is openly inciting against Hungarians. Understandably, this evokes fear and encourages self-defense among the ethnic Hungarians.

HUNGARY

Interior Ministry Department Head on State's Role in Crime Prevention

90CH0039A Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 26 Feb 90 p 5

[Interview with Dr. Antal Kacziba, department head of the Interior Ministry's National Police Headquarters, by Peter Balla; place and date not given: "The Police Cannot Prescribe Tasks for Society"—first two paragraphs are MAGYAR NEMZET introduction]

[Text] "It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them." That quotation is from Cesare Beccaria's book entitled "On Crimes and Punishments." The renowned Italian criminologist advanced this idea in the 17th century, thereby establishing the scientific basis for crime prevention in the modern sense. In the 200 years since then, crime has increased at an unprecedented rate, and various organizations dedicated to crime prevention have sprung up like mushrooms. Since 1955, the United Nations has been sponsoring regular congresses on this subject and has been formulating recommendations for its member nations.

In a roundtable discussion published in our paper a few weeks ago, we dwelt briefly on the problem of crime prevention. Is crime prevention a task for the police? If so, to what extent? We interviewed Dr. Antal Kacziba, department head of the BM ORFK [Interior Ministry's National Police Headquarters], on how the police perceive their new concept of crime prevention.

Extremes

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Extremes in both words and deeds seem to characterize the relationship between crime prevention and the police even today, and not just in the past. With unparalleled self-confidence, the police in recent decades have expropriated for themselves many of the tasks of crime prevention, as a part of a total doctrine. All of this has led to a situation in which today, in the spirit of reforms, one would best like to bar the police from any kind of preventive activity. In comparison with pursuing criminals, is crime prevention truly a dysfunction within the same organization?

[Kacziba] I would like to point out at the very start of this interview that our concept of crime prevention is nothing more than a basis for debate or, if you prefer, an exploration of the possibilities. The views on crime prevention, including the potential role of the police in it, have always been characterized by extremes. Naturally, I do not wish to belittle the role of pursuing criminals, but by itself it is like attempting to bail out a bottomless well with a leaking bucket. Crime prevention and the pursuit of criminals are not a pair of contrasting opposites. Instead, they are two different ways of treating the same social phenomenon. The statistics on solved crimes, or even on known ones, are just the tip of the iceberg. Crime prevention, in my opinion, is a state

task that manifests itself in the administration of welfare, education, and culture, and in activities of the nature of support and services. One such activity, partially in the nature of support and services, is crime prevention by the police. Of course, one could also come to the conclusion that the police have no business being engaged in crime prevention. But international practice has not upheld that view so far.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Before proceeding further, I think it would be advisable to clarify what a modern system of crime prevention, meaning not just the tasks of the police, is able to accomplish.

[Kacziba] Neither the pursuit of criminals nor crime prevention can end crime or considerably reduce the crime rate under the present conditions. The objective of modern crime prevention, and of pursuing criminals, can only be to keep criminality as an undesirable social phenomenon within bounds, at a tolerable level. In other words, criminality must not be allowed to assume an order of magnitude that would impede the implementation of society's positive decisions. In Hungary's recent past, the optimistic concepts of crime prevention reflected the paternalistic state's alleged omnipotence, unfortunately with all the familiar "results."

Let the Criminal Pay Compensation

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Under the label of protecting children, families, and youths, the police seem to have done crime prevention more harm than good. Doused with ideological sauce, the midwifery foreign to this organization's proper scope has made youths detest not only the concept, but the police as well. And the replacement rate of juvenile delinquents has risen sharply, instead of declining. All of this logically raises the question: Do the police have any business in crime prevention?

[Kacziba] The development of criminality is the product of a relatively long process. It is clearly a task for the police to find runaway children and to return them to their families. At the same time, regrettably, many of the children living at home themselves become the victims of crime more and more often. The police must intervene in such cases, specifically to protect the minor or child.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] The high rates of unsolved thefts are common knowledge. They justifiably raise the demand that the police effectively help to prevent such crimes. Have you any ideas on how this should be accomplished?

[Kacziba] The owner's attitude will automatically develop once there are real owners. The economic subjects are quite certain to do everything possible to protect their property. Up to now the police have done two things to protect property: During the past forty years they tried to cram a nonexistent owner's attitude into the economic subjects from the outside, and—as a substitute for proprietary solicitude—they themselves attempted to

safeguard socialist property. Crime prevention by the police in the future can be nothing other than the sum total of tasks, partially of a supporting, aiding nature, and partially in the nature of services, such as free advice to economic subjects and citizens on how to protect their property, including information pertaining to economic crimes against property. In possession of such advice, recommendations, and professionally evaluated information, the economic subject is already able to undertake all the security measures necessary to protect his property. Within the framework of crime prevention, of course, the police must continue to provide the customary average level of protection. Not even in the long term will we be able to supply the demand for special property protection, but "extra protection for extra property" can be solved as a paid service.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Since the abolition of police supervision and local banishment, many people have been asking: Who will be keeping an eye out for dangerous criminals?

[Kacziba] The abolition of police supervision and local banishment has closed a lengthy debate. It has become evident that these and similar, one-sided behavioral restrictions cannot rehabilitate the criminal elements that have been cast to the fringes of society. Development of the statistics on recidivous criminals provides eloquent proof of the former misconception's failure. If we want these people to find their way back into society, then—whether we like it or not—we have to provide the minimal conditions for their return. Helping them to adjust and to start anew means supporting them, and not just financially. Cynically speaking, society must decide whether it wants to do so or to build more prisons. I might add that Hungary, too, has a circle of criminals who regard crime as a way of life, as an occupation, or, if you prefer, a profession. Today, unfortunately, society does not have realistic prospects of resocializing them. Aside from providing the aforementioned minimal opportunity for this circle of criminals, it will be warranted to keep them under police supervision. To my mind, only the legal conditions are questionable. That is, on the basis of our sad experiences in the past, I consider it intolerable that the police themselves should determine whom to keep under supervision, for what reasons, and according to what rules of the game. Once a prisoner has served his sentence, the judge who oversees criminal law enforcement should decide whether the police should keep the former prisoner under supervision and how long.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Up until now the legal system and the law enforcement agencies have devoted little attention to the victims of crimes. Do you agree?

[Kacziba] Absolutely. Victimology, the science that investigates how one becomes the victim of a crime, is still in its infancy everywhere in the world. And so is the

practice of compensating the victims of crimes. Consider, for instance, that the victim of a burglary has not the least interest in having the police arrest the burglar. Because in that case the victim has to try to recover his loss, whereas otherwise his insurance carrier would reimburse a proportion of the loss. So-called compensatory sentences, under which the convicted person must compensate the victim directly, are completely lacking in our legal system. The crime prevention task of the police in this respect might be the elaboration of proposals and recommendations, as in the case of property protection. The police, for instance, could not only provide up-to-date information on the constantly changing crime foci, but could also construct behavioral models that would help citizens in foiling attempts to attack them sexually or to pick their pockets.

Patrolmen on the Streets

[MAGYAR NEMZET] A recurring complaint against the police is that there simply are not enough policemen on the streets. Are you really coping with such a shortage of personnel?

[Kacziba] The most simple approach to crime prevention is the presence of policemen. Opportunities to deploy policemen on the streets really exist only if the police regard serving the public as their most important task. If a police force is organized on the principle that its most important task is to guard the stability of political power, then a direct consequence of this is not enough policemen on the streets. In my opinion, there will be enough policemen in public places once taxpayers, through Parliament and their local governments, truly have a say in how the police spend their budgetary allotments. I wish to note, however, that the policeman's presence in itself will guarantee public order only if he is aware of serving the public, if his job does not depend on political power and on the outcome of political power struggles, and if he does not feel that the security of the "peace camp" depends on him.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Crime prevention is a state task. But what can society do to keep criminal behavior within tolerable limits?

[Kacziba] Neither the police nor any other state organization may prescribe tasks for society. Therefore it is entirely understandable, in my opinion, that I as a public servant cannot set crime prevention tasks for society. Naturally, the success of crime prevention depends predominantly on society's efforts. Society requires exactly as many such organizations as the citizens deem necessary on the basis of the Constitution and their freedom of association. We need models that reflect the equal partnership between the state and its citizens. In the future we will have to guard against vesting any civic organization with authority that might infringe on the citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms.

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